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I. INTRODUCTION
A litigator-we'll call him Ira S.-steps into the courtroom. Ira
presents his legal argument to the tribunal. "Your honor," Ira
says, "with these facts, and with this law, my client is clearly enti-
tled to judgment in his favor." The tribunal disagrees. In fact, the
tribunal expressly states that the law cited by Ira means precisely
the opposite of what Ira claims it means.
Not to be discouraged, Ira, who also happens to be a legislator,
writes a new law contradicting the opinion of the trial court. In
doing so, Ira informs the country that the trial court was wrong.
"Even better," Ira thinks, "I'll make this law retroactive. Now my
new law will be the law that was in effect at the time I brought my
case! That will show the trial court who's boss. Oh, and I won't
tell anybody about this law until it's already in effect; wouldn't
want any pesky 'public uproar' getting in the way of its passage."
Ira appeals the decision of the trial court. 'Your honor," Ira
says during oral argument, "the new law I have just written
clearly applies to the facts of this case. In fact, I wrote this law
precisely for that reason. And even though I wrote this law after
the case was decided, and even though I did not give the public
notice and time to comment on this law, it applies retroactively.
Now, you know you have to give deference to my law and enter
judgment in my client's favor." The appellate court agrees. Ira
reigns victorious, and his opponent is left scratching his head,
wondering how on earth this decision could be considered fair.
Even setting aside bad puns, in almost every circumstance, the
scenario portrayed above would be considered ridiculous. Allow-
ing lawmakers to overturn judicial decisions by enacting retroac-
tively-applicable laws targeted at individual cases and controver-
sies betrays fundamental notions of American justice.! However,
when one party to the litigation is the Internal Revenue Service
1. The author of this article should not be held responsible for her admittedly bad tax-
related sense of humor. Rather, she fully blames her law degree and Masters of Science in
taxation for this dilemma.
2. See generally U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (instilling the judicial branch with the power
to decide individual cases and controversies); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177




("IRS"), 3 this scenario is not only hypothetically plausible-it has
actually been accepted by multiple circuit courts.4
Granted, neither the Department of the Treasury nor the IRS
are "legislators" per se; rather, these governmental entities fall
under the ambit of the executive branch.5 However, these admin-
istrative agencies undoubtedly possess quasi-legislative powers, in
that they regularly enact regulations which legally bind taxpayers
and provide legal consequences for taxpayers who fail to follow
them.6 Because of these quasi-legislative powers, agencies are
bound to follow certain statutory procedures, listed in the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act ("APA"),7 before they can enact and enforce
regulations.
Under the seminal case of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.,' the United States Supreme Court
analyzed the circumstances in which a court is compelled to grant
deference to administrative regulations. The two-part test an-
nounced in Chevron holds that if (1) Congress has not directly
spoken to the statutory question at issue and (2) the agency's in-
terpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute,
then courts must give deference to the agency's interpretation. 9
This mandatory deference (known universally as "Chevron defer-
ence") is afforded to only those regulations which carry the force of
law and are promulgated pursuant to Congressional authority. 10
Unquestionably, the issue of whether a regulation has been prop-
erly enacted under the APA and the issue of whether a regulation
is entitled to deference under Chevron, are interrelated; as of yet,
however, the United States Supreme Court has not decisively con-
cluded whether an APA-noncompliant regulation should be af-
forded mandatory Chevron deference.1'
3. The federal government is a party to all federal tax litigation. In the United States
Tax Court, IRS attorneys are assigned to litigate the cases. I.R.C. § 7452 (2006). In Article
III courts, the government is represented by Department of Justice Tax Division attorneys.
28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006).
4. See infra notes 20-27.
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
6. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006).
7. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372,
7521 (2006).
8. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
10. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
11. The United States Supreme Court has mentioned APA compliance in multiple
opinions, however, stating that the fact that a regulation was promulgated via notice-and-
comment is a "significant sign" that such regulation should be afforded judicial deference.
See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714
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This Article thus examines the interplay between administra-
tive procedure under the APA and judicial deference to Treasury
regulations. As explained infra, in a very general sense, adminis-
trative agencies should issue binding regulations only after a no-
tice and comment period during which the public has an opportu-
nity to comment upon, raise objections to, or express acquiescence
with, an agency's proposed regulations. 12 One of the pertinent ex-
ceptions to the APA's mandate of notice-and-comment applies
when an agency issues interpretive, rather than legislative,
rules. 3 The treasury, when issuing regulations affecting the ad-
ministration of the Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C."), has consis-
tently claimed that the APA's rulemaking mandates do not apply,
because its regulations are interpretive in nature. 4
(2011); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173-74 (2007); Mead, 533
U.S. at 230-31.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d). The APA provides, in pertinent part:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register,
unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise
have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include--
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects
and issues involved.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data,
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consid-
eration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. When rules are re-
quired by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,
sections 556 and 557 of this title 15 U.S.C. §§ 556-571 apply instead of this subsection.
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not less
than 30 days before its effective date, except-
(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a restric-
tion;
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published with the
rule.
13. Id. § 553(b)(A)-(B). It states as follows:
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not apply--
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organiza-
tion, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief
statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
14. See Internal Revenue Manual, Part 32. Published Guidance and Other Guidance to
Taxpayers, Chapter 1. Chief Counsel Regulation Handbook, Section 5. Required Format for
Regulations, Administrative Procedure Act, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 32.1.5.4.7.5.1 (Sept.
30, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32-001-005.html (stipulating that interpretive
rules are not subject to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c), and (d)). Although most
IRS/Treasury regulations are interpretive, and therefore not subject to these provisions of
Judicial Deference
In the same breath, the Treasury expects the judiciary to afford
such regulations Chevron deference. The problem with such an
expectation is that, in order to be afforded judicial deference, ad-
ministrative regulations must be issued pursuant to Congres-
sional authority and carry the force of law. 5 Not surprisingly, the
IRS claims that, for purposes of the judicial deference analysis,
Treasury regulations do carry the force of law. 6 Thus, the quan-
dary arises-how can the Treasury claim that its regulations are
interpretive and thereby avoid the strictures of the APA, which
are designed to foster public discourse, and at the same time claim
that its regulations carry the force of law, and consequently, must
be granted deference by the judiciary? This Article proposes that
it should not; a choice between the two options must be made by
the Treasury and the IRS.
This issue carries important implications in the current field of
tax controversy. The Treasury and IRS recently received an im-
mense boost from the United States Supreme Court when it de-
cided Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v.
United States.7 The Court essentially held in Mayo that Treasury
regulations are no different from any other agency's regulations
and should be afforded Chevron deference. 8 The Mayo Court is-
sued this opinion without addressing the Treasury's lax compli-
ance with the APA. 9 In addition, numerous cases have recently
come before the Tax Court and the circuits addressing, albeit tan-
gentially, the ability of the Treasury to issue APA-violative, litiga-
tion-directed regulations which have a retroactive effect .
the APA, the IRS usually solicits public comments on all NPRMs. However, the IRS has
recently acknowledged that "[wihether a regulation is promulgated under a specific grant of
authority in the [I.R.C.] does not govern whether the regulation is interpretive or legisla-
tive." Id. at § 32.1.1.2.8.
15. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27; see also Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714.
16. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713. In a general sense, the United States Supreme Court has
agreed, finding that there is no reason to apply a different deferential standard of review to
Treasury regulations than the Court would apply to the rules of any other administrative
agency. Id. This decision does not address, however, the specific subset of Treasury regu-
lations that are issued without notice and comment.
17. Id. at 704.
18. Id. at 713-14.
19. In fact, the Mayo Court pointed out multiple times that the Treasury regulations at
issue were issued with notice-and-comment. Id. at 714. The Court stated that "notice-and-
comment procedures [are] again a consideration identified in our precedents as a 'signifi-
cant' sign that a rule merits Chevron deference." Id. (internal citations omitted). The fact
that the Treasury quite often fails to issue regulations with notice-and-comment, however,
was not addressed by the Court.
20. See Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2011),
afftd, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012); Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Comm'r, 650
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In this line of cases, explored at length in this Article, the trial
courts2' repeatedly held that, pursuant to Supreme Court prece-
dent,22 a three year statute of limitations should be used in cases
where the IRS is challenging a taxpayer's understatement of taxes
due to "overstated basis" in the taxpayer's property.23 The gov-
ernment, on the other hand, argued that a six year statute of limi-
tations should apply in this scenario. After losing multiple times
at the tax and district court level, the Treasury implemented a
regulation (without notice-and-comment), which had the effect of
overruling the lower court's opinion and bolstering the govern-
ment's argument. 2' The IRS and/or the Department of Justice
("DOJ") then appealed the lower courts' rulings and cited the new
regulation in support, obtaining mixed results at the appellate
level depending on whether or not the Circuits chose to grant the
new regulation Chevron deference."
Predictably, this line of cases has made its way to the United
States Supreme Court.27 In Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v.
United States, the Court had the opportunity, but was not re-
quired, to address whether the APA-noncompliant regulation
should be afforded deference under Chevron. As explained infra,
the Court resolved Home Concrete at Chevron step one, and thus,
F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012) (mem.); UTAM, Ltd. v. Comm'r,
645 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2100 (2012) (mem.); Grapevine Imps.,
Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012)
(mem.); Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2011); Beard v. Comm'r, 633 F.3d
616 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012) (mem.); Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United
States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm'r, 568
F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2009).
21. In other words, the tax court and district courts.
22. Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
23. "Overstated basis," on a simplistic level, means that a taxpayer has overstated the
amount it cost him to acquire the property. See I.R.C. §§ 1011(a), 1016(a) (2006). "Gain"
for purposes of taxation is generally computed by subtracting a taxpayer's basis in his
property from the amount he received upon disposition of that property. See I.R.C. §
1001(a). Thus, where a taxpayer has overstated the amount of his basis in an item of prop-
erty, the gain he reports when he disposes of that property will correspondingly be less
than if he had reported the correct amount of basis. In all of the cases listed in note 20,
supra, the taxpayer had prevailed at the trial court level on the issue of whether a three
year or six year statute of limitations should b used when the case involved a tax defi-
ciency stemming from an overstated basis.
24. Which statute of limitations should apply is a question of statutory interpretation,
explained in detail in the text accompany notes 246 through 258, infra.
25. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-i (2011). For full text of this regulation, see note 263,
infra, and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 20.
27. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2011), affd,
132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
Judicial Deference
did not determine whether the regulation's non-compliance with
the APA would have affected its legitimacy.2" This Article agrees
with the Mayo Court's determination that Chevron is the appro-
priate framework for analyzing all Treasury regulations, including
the regulation at issue in Home Concrete.29 However, under Chev-
ron step two, courts must consider whether regulations have been
issued with or without notice-and-comment and for the express
purpose of influencing litigation." Thus, Mayo should not be read
in such a manner that all Treasury regulations shall be afforded
mandatory Chevron deference simply because the Treasury chose
to enact a regulation interpreting an ambiguous statute. This
analysis ignores the fact that the Chevron test is a two-step proc-
ess."1 When an agency has not even attempted to comply with the
APA when issuing a regulation, then this Article proposes that
step two of Chevron has not been satisfied.
Part II of this essay explains the background of the APA, and
compares rulemaking under the APA to the traditional method of
Treasury and IRS rulemaking.32 Part III explores the history of
judicial deference to agency regulations, starting with pre-Chevron
doctrine and ending with the current jurisprudential landscape.33
Part IV of this Article proposes that, in light of the importance of
the APA and recent doctrinal developments, when an agency has
failed to meet the rulemaking requirements of the APA, its regula-
tions fail under Chevron step two and should not be granted man-
datory deference.34 Part V addresses the (lack of) feasibility of
28. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843 (2012).
29. Other commentators have argued that Chevron is not the appropriate starting
point for treasury regulations that have been issued without notice-and-comment. See, e.g.,
Andrew Pruitt, Judicial Deference to Retroactive Interpretive Treasury Regulations, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1558 (2011) (advocating the application of a National Muffler-based analy-
sis). However, given the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mayo and considering the
familiarity of the judiciary with the Chevron doctrine, it is this author's opinion that disre-
garding Chevron entirely is too radical an approach and does not maintain fidelity to the
doctrinal guidelines ofjudicial deference.
30. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
31. Contrary to the opinions of some commentators, an agency-favorable finding under
Chevron step one does not equate to an automatic victory for the agency. See infra note 345
and accompanying text and notes 344-46 and accompanying text. Courts still have discre-
tion to hold that an agency's interpretation of a statute is arbitrary, capricious, and unrea-
sonable. See infra note 346 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 36 through 122 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 123 through 330 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 331 through 356 and accompanying text.
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taxpayers' raising pre-enforcement APA challenges rather than
raising a judicial deference argument post-enforcement.35
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE APA AND IRS RULEMAKING
Separation of powers is one of the fundamental tenets of Ameri-
can government.3 ' However, while the Constitution purports to
separate the federal government into three discrete and identifi-
able branches37-which any avid watcher of Schoolhouse Rock38
can recite without hesitation-administrative agencies have long
been an additional player in the game of federal governance."
Agencies, in a way, muddle the traditional form of government by
combining, rather than separating powers." However, while ad-
ministrative agencies, as opposed to the President, Congress, and
courts, are not expressly authorized in the Constitution,41 their
presence is justified by the necessity to federally regulate areas
35. See infra notes 357 through 386 and accompanying text.
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison); see also Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org.
v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1441 (2011) ("The concept and operation of the separation of pow-
ers in our National Government have their principle foundations in the first three Articles
of the Constitution.").
37. See generally U.S. CONST. arts. 1, 11, 111.
38. Lynn Ahrens, Schoolhouse Rock: Three Ring Government, SCHOOLHOUSE ROCK
(1979), www.schoolhouserock.tv/ThreeRing.html. One could certainly argue that the song's
comparison of the U.S. government to a three-ring circus is entirely apropos. While an
article expounding upon that comparison must be saved for another day, the relevant
verses go as follows:
Gonna have a three-ring circus someday, People will say it's a fine one, son. Gonna
have a three-ring circus someday, People will come from miles around. Lions, tigers,
acrobats, and jugglers and clowns galore, Tightrope walkers, pony riders, elephants,
and so much more...
Guess I got the idea right here at school. Felt like a fool when they called my name,
Talkin' about the government and how it's arranged, Divided in three like a circus.
Ring one, Executive, Two is Legislative, that's Congress. Ring three, Judiciary. See
it's kind of like my circus, circus.
Id.
39. James Q. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 PUB. INT. 77, 78 (1975).
40. See STEVEN J. CANN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 8 (4th ed. 2006). This concentration of
power contrasts with the oft-stated purpose of tripartite government-that is, to "[diffuse]
power the better to secure liberty." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
41. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231 (1994). Professor Lawson argues that the post-New Deal administrative state is at
variance with the Constitution's original meaning, in part because "those agencies typically
concentrate legislative, executive, and judicial functions in the same institution, in simul-
taneous contravention of Articles I, I, and III." Id. at 1233.
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that the traditional tripartite government is ill-equipped to gov-
42ern.
Thus, despite the lack of textual authorization vis-b-vis the
Constitution, agencies quickly found their way into American gov-
ernment, and their constitutionality has been repeatedly upheld
by the Supreme Court." At the outset of America's formation,
however, the administrative state was quite small; only three ad-
ministrative departments existed during the presidency of George
Washington. 4' Agencies increased in number throughout the in-
dustrial revolution.45 In 1887, Congress created the first major
federal regulatory body, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
which was granted discretionary authority to issue binding deci-
sions on the railroad industry.46
Though their numbers were steadily increasing, until roughly
the 1930s, agencies did not possess the authority to make their
own policy decisions, but were viewed merely as conduits for en-
forcing the goals of the legislature.4 7  However, the way agencies
would be viewed and allowed to function changed dramatically
42. Jeffrey E. Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to
Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291 (2001). Administrative agencies typi-
cally are charged with regulating areas that are highly specialized or technical. Id. at 296.
Such agencies include the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Health and
Safety Administration, and the Food and Drug Administration. Id. While environmental
concerns, workplace safety issues, and the sale of healthy food and prescription drugs are
areas that the federal government can and should regulate, the ability of politicians who do
not necessarily have a background in such areas to implement regulatory policies is low.
See id. at 298. Agencies, composed of members who possess specialized knowledge and
training in their respective fields, are better equipped to regulate these areas and respond
to changing circumstances. Id.
43. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
44. KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 39 (1997).
These administrative bodies were the Department of State, the Department of War, and
the agency which is the subject of critique in this article, the Department of Treasury. Id.
45. Wilson, supra note 39, at 77. By 1881, there were 95,000 civilian officers, as com-
pared with only 3000 during the Federalist period of the late 18th and early 19th centuries.
Id.
46. Wilson, supra note 39, at 94. See also Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat.
379 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
47. See Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretive Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and
a Proposal for Public Participation, 1986 DuKE L.J. 346, 351 (1986). Prior to 1932, it was
understood that Congress could not delegate legislative power; thus, the ability of agencies
themselves to make legislative rules was weak to non-existent. Id. See also United States
v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) ("That the legislative power of
Congress cannot be delegated is, of course, clear."). However, by 1940, the Supreme Court
had changed its course and overruled the non-delegation doctrine, opening the doors for
legislative rulemaking by agencies. Sunshine Anthracite Coal v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398
(1940) ("Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as necessary in order that the
exertion of legislative power does not become a futility.").
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with the implementation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New
Deal.48 The Roosevelt administration not only allowed agencies to
implement the policies of Congress, but also entrusted administra-
tive agencies with their own policy-making functions.49 Agencies
were permitted to self-regulate, in order to foster economic stabil-
ity.5" During the New Deal era, it was emphasized that adminis-
trative agencies were the experts in the field they represented.5
This is a concept that has persisted into the twenty-first century.
The utter necessity of administrative agencies-to implement
legislation, create and enforce policy objectives, undertake studies
in varied and sometimes highly technical fields, and so on-cannot
be understated.52 However, with the increased power that agen-
cies began to possess beginning in the 1930s and continuing to the
present day comes the potential that such power will be abused.53
Moreover, on a fundamental level, the agencies needed procedural
checks and balances, in order to imbibe administrative rulemak-
ing with the same legitimacy afforded to legislative lawmaking."
Thus, in an attempt to proscribe legitimate regulatory procedures
and protect the citizenry from potential abuse, Congress enacted
the APA in 1946. 22
48. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,424
(1987).
49. Shuren, supra note 42, at 295-96. Prior to the New Deal, the courts along with
many political leaders agreed that agencies should possess a limited scope of power.
WARREN, supra note 44, at 39.
50. MARC ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSITION 89 (1993).
51. BRUCE ACKERMAN & WILLIAM HASSLER, CLEAN COALDIRTY AIR 12 (1981).
52. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3:3, at 157 (2d ed. 1978) ("The kind of
government we have developed is impossible except through delegation with meaningful
standards ... ."); see also Brian Cook, The Representative Function of Bureaucracy: Public
Administration in Constitutive Perspective, 23 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 4, 107 (1992) (discussing the
necessity of a bureaucracy to administer many of the tasks fundamental to running a na-
tion).
53. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, 79TH CONGRESS, 1944-46, at 111 (1946) [hereinafter APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
54. See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 4.12 (3d ed. 1991).
55. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2006); see also APA:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 53, at 350 (Speaking to the abuse potential, Statesman
Elihu Root opined, "[y]et the powers that are committed to these regulating agencies, and
which they must have to do their work, Carry with them great and dangerous opportunities
of oppression and wrong. If we are to continue a government of limited powers these agen-
cies of regulation must themselves be regulated.").
Vol. 50808
Judicial Deference
A. The Basics of APA Rulemaking
The APA was enacted in keeping with the fundamental tripar-
tite system of American democracy. 6 Agencies, in effect, merge
the three branches of government." Agencies generally fall within
the ambit of the executive branch;58 however, they function as leg-
islatures when they enact regulations that are binding upon citi-
zens and function as courts when they impose sanctions or penal-
ties upon citizens who violate such regulations." Under the tradi-
tional executive-legislative-judicial notion of governance, checks
and balances are effectuated when each branch is both subject to
the control of and can exercise review over the other branches.60
Because an administrative agency inherently possesses the power
of each governmental branch and thus is not subject to the same
checks-and-balances monitoring, oversight must be provided in
some other way."
Thus, the APA employs three procedural devices as a substitute
for traditional checks and balances: public information, adminis-
trative operation, and judicial review. 2 The public information
requirement demands that agencies disclose information about
their organizational structure and procedures, along with publish-
ing "substantive and interpretive rules which they have framed
for the guidance of the public." 3 The judicial review element "pre-
scribes . . . how far the courts may go in examining into a given
case." 4 Most relevant for purposes of this Article are the APA's
requirements relative to administrative operation-codified at 5
U.S.C. § 553.
56. APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 53, at 1II.
57. See CANN, supra note 40.
58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. However, statutes can also create so-called "independent"
agencies whose heads are not appointed by the President. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914)
(creating the Federal Trade Commission and providing for the nomination of agency offi-
cers).
59. APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 53, at 149 (statement of Rep. Francis E.
Walter).
60. BRADDOCK COMMC'NS, ABOUT AMERICA: HOW THE UNITED STATES IS GOVERNED 20
(2004), available at httpJ/www.america.gov/media/pdf/books/governed.pdf.
61. See Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA Four Lessons Since
1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 271 (1986) ("In attempting to control administrative processes,
the drafters of the APA responded to two quite general constitutional themes .... The first
concerns the usurpation of government by powerful private groups. The second involves
the danger of self-interested representation: the pursuit by political actors of interests that
diverge from those of the citizenry.").





APA § 553 mandates that agencies submit notices of proposed
regulations and allow interested parties to submit comments in
lieu of the traditional congressional hearing that would otherwise
be held during the legislative process.65 The process outlined in §
553 functions as a substitute for a legislative hearing and is de-
signed to encourage public participation in agency rulemaking.66
This integral framework of the APA is designed to ensure that
agencies function in essentially the same manner as legislatures
when performing legislative functions-they develop a rule, sub-
mit it for public comment, entertain and evaluate the comments
submitted by the citizenry, and only then do they bind the public
to the regulation. 7
The procedures an agency must follow when issuing a rule are
strictly defined in the statute. First, the agency must publish a
public notice of its proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register.68
Second, the agency must allow the public to submit comments on
the proposed rule.69 Once the agency has considered the comments
submitted by the public, it is then permitted to issue a final rule
and must include a "concise general statement of [the rule's] basis
and purpose."" The agency then republishes the rule in the Fed-
eral Register, and after a period of thirty days, the rule can be-
come effective.7' This collective process is known as "notice-and-
comment rulemaking." 2
Likewise, the situations in which agencies may be excused from
notice-and-comment rulemaking are limited and defined. The four
principal exceptions to the general notice-and-comment require-
ments are: interpretive rules, procedural rules, policy statements,
and good cause.73 The APA does not define interpretive rules, pro-
65. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
66. Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury's (Lack of)
Compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1727, 1728 (2007); see also Am. Hosp Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044
(1987) (noting that notice-and-comment rulemaking "reintroduce[s] public participation
and fairness to affected parties after governmental authority has been delegated to unrep-
resentative agencies.").
67. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
68. Id. § 553(b).
69. Id. § 553(c).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 553(d).
72. See Hickman, supra note 66, at 1734.
73. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). Other exclusions do exist, but are not relevant for purposes of




cedural rules, or policy statements.74 The good cause exception is
permitted when notice-and-comment would be "impracticable, un-
necessary, or contrary to the public intent."5 Any agency assert-
ing the good cause exception must state that it is doing so and ex-
plain its reasoning for such assertion when issuing the final ver-
sion of the regulation."
Violating the procedural mandates of the APA should not-and
generally does not--come without consequence.77 APA § 704 pro-
vides a cause of action to challenge "final agency action," including
issuing temporary and final regulations."8 Under § 706 of the
APA, reviewing courts are given the power to determine the appli-
cability of the terms of an agency's action.79 This provision also
demands that a reviewing court "hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . without
observance of procedure required by law . . . ." Courts have the
power to declare regulations invalid for failure to abide by the
APA and may enjoin agencies from making decisions based upon
such non-compliant regulations."
Thus far, the road from promulgation to enforcement seems
pretty clear. An agency follows the APA's mandates, and the rule
can be enforced. An agency fails to do so, and the courts can strike
that rule down. However, from both a doctrinal and a practical
perspective, denying judicial deference to an APA-noncompliant
regulation is not so simple. To invalidate a regulation based upon
74. See Hickman, supra note 66, at 1734. As such, courts have predictably been incon-
sistent when applying these exceptions. Id. (citing Robert A. Anthony, "Interpretive" Rules,
"Legislative" Rules and "Spurious" Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U. 1, 2-6
(1994)). However, these types of exceptions generally apply to rules that, while providing
guidance, do not bind the public, the government, or the courts. See RICHARD J. PIERCE,
JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.4 (5th ed. 2010).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B).
76. Id. Section 553(d)(3) also allows an agency to invoke good cause to avoid the thirty
day advance publication period for final rules. Id. Courts also require an agency that is
asserting good cause as an exemption from APA compliance to do so expressly and contem-
poraneously with the promulgation of the regulation. See Buschmann v. Schweiker, 676
F.2d 352, 356-57 (9th Cir. 1982).
77. See JAMES T. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 13:1 (2d ed. 2007). In fact,
Treasury regulations are somewhat of an anomaly in administrative law in that their regu-
lations are rarely challenged under the APA. APA challenges to other administrative regu-
lations are rather common. See id. ("Pre-enforcement injunction actions are sometimes
begun the very day an agency rule is promulgated .... ."). The reasons for this discrepancy
between tax and non-tax APA challenges are explained more fully in section V, infra.
78. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
79. Id. § 706.
80. Id. § 706(2)(D).
81. See Sacora v. Thomas, 628 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 2010).
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an APA violation, the regulation must actually be challenged in a
proceeding, which, for reasons explained infra, is not always likely
to occur.82 It is unclear what the courts are to do when an agency
doesn't play by the rules of rulemaking and nobody brings an APA
challenge. When the agency later relies upon these APA-violative
regulations in a civil proceeding, must the court grant these regu-
lations deference pursuant to Chevron, since the regulations do
carry the force of law? Or should the judiciary be given leeway to
decide that, even if the preliminary doctrinal requirements of judi-
cial deference are met, it can nonetheless refuse to defer? These
questions are answered in Section III, infra.
B. The Treasury's Failure to Play by the Rules of Rulemaking
One might expect that the Treasury, one of the oldest-and ar-
guably the most powerful" 3 -administrative agencies, would be
well-aware of and abide by the strictures of the APA. The rela-
tionship between the Treasury's rulemaking process and the APA
is not exactly symbiotic, however. The I.R.C. grants the Depart-
ment of Treasury broad interpretive authority over the Code's
provisions. This authority is conveyed in one of two ways -either
82. See infra section V.
83. The Treasury Department was established by Congress in 1789. Act of Sept. 2,
1789, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 65. Unlike many more niche agencies, the rules set forth and the
actions taken by the Treasury affect virtually every American. According to the Depart-
ment's web page, the Treasury "is the executive agency responsible for promoting economic
prosperity and ensuring the financial security of the United States." Duties & Functions of
the U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. TREASURY, www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-
treasury/pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). The basic functions of the Treas-
ury include: managing federal finances, collecting taxes owed to the United States and
paying the bills of the United States, enforcing federal finance and tax laws, and investigat-
ing and prosecuting tax evaders, counterfeiters, and forgers. Id. The IRS is one of the
operating bureaus included in the Treasury Department. Id. Considering that the IRS has
the ability to take money and property from Americans without a prior hearing or a court
order, see I.R.C. § 6331 (2006), the power of the Treasury Department cannot be overstated.
This centralized accumulation of power-i.e., the power of one agency to promulgate, exe-
cute, and adjudicate rules-is the precise reason the APA was enacted. APA: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 53, at 350.
84. This Article only addresses the authority of the Treasury to issue binding regula-
tions. The Treasury and the IRS, in fact, have much broader interpretive authority. The
IRS also issues official, published guidance known as Revenue Rulings, which explain how
the IRS interprets the law as applied to a given set of facts. Treas. Reg. §
601.601(d)(2)(i)(a) (2011). Furthermore, the IRS may issue a Private Letter Ruling ("PLR")
when requested by a taxpayer under specified circumstances, informing that taxpayer how
the IRS would interpret that taxpayer's situation. Rev. Proc. 2012-1, 2012-1 I.R.B. 1. The
level of deference or judicial respect that should be afforded to such less formal, though
frequently used, forms of guidance issued by the IRS is beyond the scope of this Article.
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through a specific authorization to promulgate regulations" or
pursuant to the Treasury's general rulemaking authority'6. The
I.R.C. contains several hundred specific authority grants.87 These
specific authority grants are identified by Congress and direct the
Treasury to fill in identified statutory gaps." Regulations promul-
gated pursuant to these specific authority grants have tradition-
ally been denoted as "legislative" regulations. 9
In addition, the I.R.C. grants the Treasury general rulemaking
authority to develop "all needful rules and regulations for the en-
forcement of' the Code.90 These rules are known as "interpretive"
regulations. 9' The regulations, which were at play in Home Con-
crete and are the subject of this Article, are general authority
regulations.92 Despite their monikers, legislative and interpretive
regulations are equally important in the eyes of taxpayers. 93
Treasury regulations are further classified according to their fi-
nality. The Treasury has the authority to issue proposed, tempo-
rary, and final regulations. Proposed regulations do not carry the
force of law94 , whereas temporary and final regulations are binding
when issued.9' The major distinction between temporary and final
85. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1502 (2006).
86. Id. § 7805(a).
87. See, e.g., id. § 6103(q) (2012); id. § 7502(c)(2) (2006).
88. For example, I.R.C. § 6103(q) directs the Secretary of Treasury "to prescribe such
other regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this section." This lan-
guage is representative of "specific authority" contained in the I.R.C.
89. See Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations: A Reconsideration in
Light of National Cable, Swallows Holding, and Other Developments, 61 TAX LAW. 481, 485-
86 (2008).
90. I.R.C. § 7805(a).
91. See Berg, supra note 89, at 485-86.
92. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-i (2011) (authority applicable to entire part: 26 U.S.C. §
7805).
93. If you violate either type of regulation and the IRS catches you, you are in for one
unhappy audit. Even an unintentional failure to adhere to the Treasury's "rules and regu-
lations" will subject a taxpayer to penalties. I.R.C. § 6662(a)-(b) (the "accuracy-related
penalty"). The Treasury's regulations interpreting the accuracy-related penalty do not
distinguish between specific and general authority regulations in circumscribing § 6662's
applicability. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3 (2011). Thus, both types of regulations are binding on
taxpayers, and violating either type of regulation subjects a taxpayer to equal concomitant
penalties.
94. See S. Cent. United Food & Commercial Workers Unions & Emp'rs Health & Wel-
fare Trust v. Appletree Mkts., Inc. (In re Appletree Mkts, Inc.), 19 F.3d 969, 973 (5th Cir.
1994) (noting that proposed regulations are entitled to no force and effect until finalized).
95. Hickman, supra note 66, at 1759 ("[The] Treasury and the IRS treat temporary
Treasury regulations as legally binding on taxpayers as well as the government."). See also
Redlark v. Comm'r, 141 F.3d 936, 939 (9th Cir. 1998) (deferring to temporary regulations
under Chevron).
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regulations is that temporary regulations expire three years after
being issued.96
The distinction between legislative and interpretive regulations
in the tax context can be misleading, especially when applied to
the judicial deference doctrine, if not properly examined.97 Inter-
pretive Treasury regulations do not carry any less weight than do
legislative regulations.98 In a practical sense, both types of regula-
tions have the same effect. The only distinction is the source of
authority under which the regulation was promulgated.99 Criti-
cally, because both types of regulations are "rules" under the
APA, 00 the Treasury is bound to follow APA notice-and-comment
96. I.R.C. § 7805(e)(2). Other than their respective life-spans, temporary and final
regulations have virtually identical practical effects. The Treasury's own regulations define
both temporary and final regulations issued under the I.R.C. as "rules or regulations" for
purposes of the Code's penalty provisions. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-3(b)(2), 1.6694-3(e) (2011);
see also I.R.C. §§ 6662(a)-(b)(1), 6662(c), 6694(b). The government, taxpayers, and the
courts all agree that temporary and final Treasury regulations are equally binding on both
the government and taxpayers. See, e.g., Estate of Gerson v. Comm'r, 507 F.3d 435, 438
(6th Cir. 2007); Irving Salem, Ellen P. April] & Linda Galler, ABA Section of Taxation Re-
port of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 735 (2004) ("Unlike proposed
regulations, temporary regulations are effective when they initially appear in the Federal
Register, thus providing immediate and binding guidance to taxpayers.").
97. Most importantly, the interpretive versus legislative distinction in the I.R.C. is not
the same as the interpretative versus legislative distinction in the APA. Historically, how-
ever, the distinction between legislative and interpretive regulations was very significant,
and a brief synopsis of the nature and development of this distinction is in order. Under
the now outdated non-delegation doctrine, Congress could not delegate legislative functions
to any other branch of government. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287
U.S. 77, 85 (1932). Thus, during the time that the non-delegation doctrine was in effect,
there was no need for a legislative/interpretive distinction. Regulations could only be in-
terpretive, because agencies could not be delegated the power to make legislative decisions.
However, in 1940, the Supreme Court expressly allowed the delegation of legislative deci-
sion-making. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398-400 (1940). Pur-
suant to the demise of the non-delegation doctrine, administrative agencies could then
either make legislative (i.e., binding) rules or could issue rules that did not have the force of
law but merely explained rights already created by statute. See Saunders, supra note 47,
at 350. As explained infra, the formal distinction between legislative and interpretive
regulations in the tax context has all but disappeared, because even regulations character-
ized as "interpretive" have the force and effect of law.
98. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. U.S., 131 S. Ct. 704, 714 (2011)
(whether a rule carries the force of law "does not turn on whether Congress's delegation of
authority was general or specific").
99. This distinction has been rendered largely irrelevant by Mayo. See infra notes 187-
222.
100. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006) (defining a "rule" as "the
whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe the organi-
zation, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency. . . ."). Rules differ from a "state-
ment of policy," which merely "pronounces existing rights or liabilities." APA: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 53, at 197.
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procedures when issuing both legislative and interpretive regula-
tions."' This, however, the Treasury has been wont to do.
The Treasury's lax compliance with the APA was thoroughly
documented in a 2007 empirical study conducted and published by
Professor Hickman. 2 Professor Hickman conducted a study of
232 separate regulatory projects for which the Treasury issued
Treasury Decisions ("TDs") and Notices of Proposed Rulemaking
("NPRMs") in the Federal Register from January 1, 2003 through
December 31, 2005.13 Professor Hickman found that the rulemak-
ing did not comply with the APA ninety-five times, or in 40.9 per-
cent of the total projects studied.0 4 Of these ninety-five violations,
eighty-four violations consisted of the Treasury issuing binding
temporary regulations simultaneously with NPRMs On eleven
additional occasions, final regulations were issued without notice-
and-comment altogether.'
The issuance of temporary regulations simultaneously with
NPRMs defeats the purpose of notice-and-comment rulemaking. 7
Although temporary regulations expire either after three years or
when the final regulations are issued, such regulations are bind-
ing when issued.' 8 The purpose of the APA is to protect affected
parties before a rule becomes binding.0 9 Thus, this purpose is vio-
lated when temporary regulations are issued absent notice-and-
comment, even if the agency allows for a period of comment in the
interim, between the temporary and final regulations."0 The dis-
101. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
102. See Hickman, supra note 66.
103. Id. at 1730.
104. Id. at 1748.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1749.
107. This issuance of legally-binding temporary regulations without notice-and-
comment, along with the simultaneous request for post-promulgation comment, is known
as "interim-final rulemaking" and has been heavily criticized as a violation of both the
letter and spirit of the APA. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste
Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 703, 704 (1999). See also Administrative Conference of the
United States, Notices, Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,111-12 (Aug.
18, 1995) ("Courts generally have not allowed post-promulgation comment as an alternative
to the prepromulgation notice-and-comment process in situations where no exemption [to
APA § 553] is justified.").
108. See supra note 95. This is akin to Congress enacting a law without holding any
type of public hearing or considering any public commentary and then enforcing that law
upon the public.
109. APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 53, at 353.
110. Under the APA's intended scheme, "regulated parties are only bound by regulations
on which they have previously had an opportunity to comment." Kristin E. Hickman, A
Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury's (Lack o] Compliance with Administrative
Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1160 (2008). To the
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pensation of final regulations without any notice-and-comment
whatsoever is even more disturbing, because the public never has
an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process.
The Treasury's main excuse for its consistent lack of APA com-
pliance is that the regulations fit within one of the exceptions to
APA rulemaking procedures. As noted supra, an agency does not
have to follow APA § 553's procedures if the regulation is interpre-
tive or procedural, or if the agency can demonstrate good cause
why notice-and-comment rulemaking need not be followed.111 Pro-
fessor Hickman found that whether or not the Treasury actually
followed the traditional APA steps, the agency disclaimed the ap-
plicability of the APA in 92.7% of its projects.11 2 In those projects
where the Treasury violated the APA by issuing temporary regu-
lations concurrently with NPRMs, the Treasury claimed the good
cause exception fifteen times (17.86%), was silent as to applicabil-
ity three times (3.57%), and expressly disclaimed the APA without
giving a reason sixty-six times (78.57%)."1  Where the Treasury
issued final regulations without notice-and-comment altogether,
the Treasury claimed both the interpretive rule and the proce-
dural rule exceptions one time each (8.33%, respectively), claimed
the good cause exception six times (50%), and claimed inapplica-
bility with no reason given four times (33.34%) .
The Treasury claims that most of its regulations are interpre-
tive.115 The basis for such a declaration is questionable at best,
however.16 All Treasury regulations are legislative rules for APA
purposes, whether promulgated under specific or general author-
contrary, the "Treasury routinely imposes a legal burden upon taxpayers to conform to
regulations before submitting those regulations for public comment." Id. Regardless of
whether the Treasury considers post-promulgation public comment, the fact remains that
the public was bound without notice-and-comment the instant the temporary regulation
went into effect.
111. See supra notes 73 through 76 (explaining the exceptions from notice-and-comment
rulemaking).
112. Hickman, supra note 66, at 1749. In 81.55 percent of the total projects, the Treas-
ury did not even offer a basis for its position of non-applicability other than a conclusory
statement. Id.
113. Id. at 1750, tbl.2a.
114. Id. at 1751, tbl.2b.
115. Internal Revenue Manual, supra note 14 ("Although most IRS/Treasury regulations
are interpretative, and therefore not subject to the notice-and-comment provisions of the
APA, the Service usually solicits public comment when it promulgates a rule."). See also
Brief for Appellee at 39-42, Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249
(4th Cir. 2011), affd, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 09-2353) (claiming that Treas. Reg. §
301.6501(e)-i (2011)is an interpretive rule and exempt from the A-PA's rulemaking re-
quirements).
116. Hickman, supra note 66, at 1757.
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ity."7 Both general and specific authority regulations carry the
force of law, affecting taxpayers' rights and obligations 18 , thereby
making such rules "legislative" by definition."' Moreover, if the
Treasury and the IRS are being honest in their assessment of
Treasury regulations as interpretive, then one would think they
must be foreclosed from arguing that these regulations carry the
force of law and are entitled to deference. 20  As of now, however,
the Treasury has been successful in its argument that, even
though many of its regulations are exempt from the APA, 12' they
are nonetheless entitled to the level of deference only afforded to
those regulations that carry the force of law and have been prom-
ulgated pursuant to Congressional authority.
22
III. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
TO AGENCY REGULATIONS
Although Chevron 2' is universally considered the landmark de-
cision on judicial deference to agency regulations, United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area does predate the Chev-
ron case. 124  Before Chevron was decided, Skidmore v. Swift &
Co.'25 controlled federal courts' review of agency rulemaking.
26
The Skidmore Court held that agency interpretations were merely
persuasive, rather than controlling, and that courts should look to
117. Id. at 1773; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (characterizing a general authority grant as an "implicit" delega-
tion of legislative authority and recognizing that a regulation promulgated pursuant to
general authority is equally binding as a specific authority regulation).
118. Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 381, 393-401 (1985).
119. APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 53, at 197, 200. See also Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006).
120. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that only adminis-
trative regulations which carry the force of law are entitled to Chevron deference, with the
rest being entitled only to varying levels of respect).
121. Considering that the Treasury disclaimed APA applicability over 90 percent of the
time it promulgated a rule, it follows that the Treasury considers almost none of its rules to
really be rules, at least for administrative procedure purposes. See Hickman, supra note
66, at 1749.
122. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
123. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
124. Moreover, Chevron did not wipe the judicial deference slate clean, so to speak, as
pre-Chevron cases continued to be cited and utilized post-decision. See infra note 186,
which cites cases to show the competing standards of review applied to both tax and non-
tax cases after Chevron.
125. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
126. David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference to Administrative
Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 334 (2000).
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factors such as the validity and consistency of the agency's reason-
ing when deciding if the agency action deserved deference.'27
Thus, after Skidmore, where "an agency's rule 'flatly contradicted'
its prior rule, was of recent vintage, or concerned a non-technical
area within the court's expertise, courts were less apt to defer to
the rule."'28
In the interim between Skidmore and Chevron came a tax-
specific judicial deference case, National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v.
United States.'29  Like Skidmore, National Muffler mandated a
context-based approach to the judicial deference analysis, provid-
ing that:
In determining whether a particular regulation carries out
the congressional mandate in a proper manner, we look to see
whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of
the statute, its origin, and its purpose. A regulation may
have particular force if it is a substantially contemporaneous
construction of the statute by those presumed to have been
aware of its congressional intent. If the regulation dates from
a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits inquiry.
Other relevant considerations are the length of time the regu-
lation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consis-
tency of the Commissioner's interpretation, and the degree of
scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during sub-
sequent re-enactments of the statute.
130
Thus, as in Skidmore, the Court advised that interpreting
courts should look beyond the face of the regulation in determin-
ing whether to grant that regulation deference. Post-Skidmore
and National Muffler, courts had wide discretion to overturn
agency regulations and interpretations. This all changed, how-
ever, with the Court's watershed decision in Chevron.
127. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. In regard to agency decisions, the Court found that:
[W]hile not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, [agency deci-
sions] do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a par-
ticular case [depends] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
Id.
128. Hasen, supra note 126, at 334 (citing Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485
(1947); Frank Diehl Farms v. Sec'y of Labor, 696 F.2d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 1983)).
129. Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
130. Nat'l Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477.
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A. Transferring Power with the Chevron Two-Step
Similar to the authority granted to the Treasury by the I.R.C. to
enact "needful regulations," 3' the Clean Air Act gives the Admin-
istrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the au-
thority to "prescribe such regulations ... as are necessary to carry
out his functions under" the act. 132 Utilizing the required APA no-
tice-and-comment procedures,33 the EPA exercised its general au-
thority to promulgate a regulation defining a statutorily-
undefined term, "stationary source." 34 After the Reagan admini-
stration initiated a "[giovernment-wide reexamination of regula-
tory burdens and complexities," however, the EPA reconsidered its
definition and again utilized notice-and-comment to adopt a new
definition of stationary source.'3 ' The Natural Resources Defense
Council challenged the subsequent interpretation of the term."
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals rejected the new regu-
lation and employed its own interpretation of this ambiguous
term.
137
The Supreme Court disagreed with the circuit court's approach
to the judicial deference analysis.131 In so doing, the Chevron
Court elucidated a new standard of judicial deference for agency
regulations and mandated judicial adherence to agency interpre-
tations so long as such interpretation is reasonable. 9 The Court
131. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1) (2006).
133. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans;
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,697 (Aug. 7,
1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 124).
134. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 860 (1984)
(citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.18(j)(1)(i), (ii) (1983)). In the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act,
Congress required states that had not attained the national air quality standards set by the
EPA to establish a program regulating "new or modified stationary sources" of air pollution.
42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (2006).
135. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 858 (citing Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and
Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans,
46 Fed. Reg. 16,280-01, 16,281 (Mar. 12, 1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52)).
136. Id. at 841.
137. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub
nom. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The
lower court found that the legislative history of the 1977 amendments did not explicitly
address what Congress intended by the term "stationary source." Natural Res. Def. Coun-
cil, 685 F.2d at 723. As a result of this ambiguity, the circuit court interpreted the statute
by analyzing its own precedent concerning the Clean Air Act and found that the new EPA
regulations conflicted with judicial precedent. Id. at 726.
138. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45.
139. Id. at 844.
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criticized the court of appeals' approach as substituting its own
judgment for that of the agency.
140
The upshot of Chevron is the famous two-part inquiry now in-
grained in administrative law: first, whether the statute being
interpreted clearly and unambiguously resolves the issue, and if
not, whether the agency's interpretation of the statute is a per-
missible one.1 4 ' Chevron is important because it forces courts to
essentially take a backseat to agencies in many instances of statu-
tory interpretation. 142 This is true not only where Congress spe-
cifically mandates regulations, but also where Congress implicitly
delegates rulemaking authority, by enacting a statute and grant-
ing an administrative agency the power to proscribe regulations
necessary to carry out the agency's functions.' Professor Hick-
man describes the Chevron decision as representing "a transfer of
interpretive power from the judicial branch to administrative
,,141agencies.
The Chevron Court recognized that interpreting ambiguous
statutes necessarily entails making policy judgments. 45  In the
Court's opinion, it is the administrative agencies, not the courts,
which should be making these policy decisions.146 The Court ex-
plained its rationale as follows:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there
is an express delegation of authority to the agency to eluci-
date a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on
140. Id. at 845. ("In light of these well-settled principles it is clear that the Court of
Appeals misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations at issue.").
141. Id. at 843. Of course, the first prong of Chevron existed as a maxim of statutory
interpretation even prior to the Court's decision. When a statute is unambiguous, neither
administrative agencies nor courts have the authority to substitute their own interpreta-
tions for the plain language of the statute. Id. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted) ("If a court,
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an in-
tention on the precise issue at question, that intention is the law and must be given ef-
fect.").
142. Id. at 844 ("[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provi-
sion for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." (emphasis
added)).
143. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
144. Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1548 (2006).




a particular occasion is implicit rather than explicit. In such
a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by
the administrator of an agency."'
This holding allows for both agency freedom within the scope of
permissibility, and further permits agencies to change their minds
should a new interpretation be subsequently deemed more favor-
able.'48 However, the Court stopped short of mandating deference
to all statutory interpretations by agencies. Only where an
agency's interpretation is a permissible one is that interpretation
afforded judicial deference. 9
Under this "permissible" prong, i.e., Chevron step two, an
agency interpretation will be upheld so long as it is not arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.15 Although this
language affords powerful deference to administrative rules,
Chevron is not a "blank check for administrative fiat.""' Chevron
step two still affords courts some, albeit tightly limited, discretion
to strike down administrative regulations that are arbitrary or
manifestly unreasonable.
Although the Chevron Court did not limit the application of the
two-part test to any doctrinal subset of administrative law, both
scholars and litigants argued that National Muffler still applied
post-Chevron to tax cases."' In other words, the National Muffler
proponents argued in favor of tax exceptionalism-i.e., that tax
law is different than other areas of administrative law and that
Treasury regulations should not necessarily be afforded Chevron
147. Id. at 843-44.
148. This is in contrast to the prior decisions of Skidmore and National Muffler, which
looked unfavorably upon an agency's inconsistent interpretations of the same statute. See
supra text accompanying notes 125-30.
149. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
150. Id. at 844.
151. See Hickman, supra note 144, at 1553.
152. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081 (2005);
John Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations and
Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 83 (2003) (arguing that the Skidmore
standard applies in this context); Noel Cunningham & James Repetti, Textualism and Tax
Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2004) (summarizing the Chevron/Skidmore/National Muffler
dispute); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:
The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002) (indicating that the Skidmore stan-
dard may apply in the case of interpretive tax regulations); Salem, Aprill & Galler, supra
note 96 (arguing in favor of using factors enunciated in National Muffler to assess the va-
lidity of interpretive tax regulations); see also Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the
Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185 (2004) (also noting the dispute among Chevron,
Skidmore, and National Muffler).
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deference. Courts did nothing to clear up this confusion, continu-
ing to cite National Muffler in tax decisions even after Chevron
was decided.'53 In recent years, however, the continued viability of
the National Muffler multi-factor analysis has arguably' been
put to rest with the Court's decisions in Mead, Brand X, and
Mayo, discussed infra.
B. Administrative Power Reinforced: Post-Chevron Decisions
1. United States v. Mead Corp.
In the years since Chevron, the administrative deference doc-
trine has been functionally reinforced, while at the same time, the
scope of regulations to which deference must be granted has been
tightened. The doctrine was strengthened in United States v.
Mead Corp. ,"'wherein the Court reiterated that granting Chevron
deference to applicable administrative regulations is not a judg-
ment call, but rather is mandatory."' Contemporaneously, the
Court made clear that this stringent deference is warranted only
for agency interpretations promulgated through the exercise of
congressionally delegated authority to bind regulated parties
"with the force of law."157
Thus, as a correlative to Mead's reinforcement of Chevron defer-
ence for legally-binding regulations, Mead also advised courts to
apply Chevron deference judiciously. According to the Mead
Court, Chevron only applies when a court affirmatively finds that
Congress implicitly delegated primary interpretive power, and the
agency exercised that power in question."' This is due to the un-
153. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 217 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2000); Schuler Indus. Inc.
v. United States, 109 F.3d 753 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Snowa v. Comm'r, 123 F.3d 190, 197-98
(4th Cir. 1997) (general authority regulations get National Muffler review after Chevron);
Nalle v. Comm'r, 997 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court, while not taking any
official stance, continued to cite to both cases post-Chevron. Compare Cottage Sav. Ass'n v.
Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1991) (citing National Muffler), with Newark Morning
Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 575-76 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing both
National Muffler and Chevron), and Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 523 U.S. 382, 387-89
(1998) (citing and applying the two-part test of Chevon).
154. The qualifier is inserted because National Muffler has not been explicitly overruled,
even if it has been so functionally.
155. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
156. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226.
157. Id. at 226-27.
158. Id. ("Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an
agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some
other indication of a comparable congressional intent.").
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derstanding that Congress, at least implicitly, desired that an
agency, rather than the courts, be the primary interpreter of a
particular statutory scheme.59
For those regulations that fail to meet either the delegation of
authority or the exercise of authority prong of Mead, the Court
determined that Skidmore respect was the appropriate standard
of review to be utilized. 160 Unlike Chevron's mandatory deference
regime, Skidmore respect affords the courts much more discre-
tion.16 ' The policy behind Skidmore, the Mead Court found, was
similar to the policy behind Chevron. 61 Where Congress does not
intend that an agency be the primary interpreter of its statutes,
but at the same time permits agencies to issue interpretive regu-
lations, the judiciary remains the final arbiter of the law.'
Skidmore respect allows a reviewing court to defer to the agency
regulation where sensible, but does not mandate the judicial def-
erence of Chevron.' Again however, where regulations have been




2. National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Services
Perhaps the strongest amplification of pro-Chevron deference
came with the United States Supreme Court's 2005 decision in
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Services. 6  Therein, the Court addressed the question of whether
the judiciary must defer to agency interpretations that actually
contradict a prior judicial construction-i.e., whether Chevron def-
erence or stare decisis should be the prevailing doctrine concern-
ing the enforceability of administrative regulations.6 7 The Court
held that Chevron deference should be utilized and issued an opin-
159. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984)).
160. Id. at 234-35.
161. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)).
162. Id. at 237-38.
163. Id. at 227.
164. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
165. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27. As argued in Section IV infra, doctrinally, the Mead
decision forecloses any argument that National Muffler or Skidmore is the appropriate
standard of review for regulations that carry the force of law.
166. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
167. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980.
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ion that unqualifiedly favors agency over judicial interpretations
of ambiguous statutes.6 '
In Brand X, the Court reviewed a Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision holding that broadband cable service was properly
classified as a "telecommunications service" under the Communi-
cations Act of 1934.169 Although the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") had issued regulations determining that
broadband cable service was not a telecommunications service,7 '
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals chose not to follow the FCC's
interpretation of the statute17' and instead relied on circuit prece-
dent holding that this type of service was a telecommunications
172service.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. In so doing, the Court held that:
A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an
agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference
only if the prior court holds that its construction follows from
the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no
room for agency discretion. This principle follows from Chev-
ron itself ... Chevron's premise is that it is for agencies, not
courts, to fill statutory gaps. The better rule is to hold judicial
interpretations contained in precedents to the same demand-
ing Chevron step one standard that applies if the court is re-
viewing the agency's construction on a blank slate: Only a ju-
dicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously fore-
closes the agency's interpretation, and therefore contains no
gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency con-
struction.
7 1
Brand X is therefore a critical decision in favor of agency pri-
macy. Brand X stands for the proposition that even stare decisis
168. Id.
169. Id. at 973 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (1934)).
170. Id. at 979 (citing In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over
Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4823-24 (2002), aff'd in part, vacated in part
sub nom. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom.
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)).
171. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub
nom. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
172. AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877-80 (9th Cir. 2000), rev'g, 43 F.Supp.2d
1146 (D. Or. 1999).
173. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-83.
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will not stand in the way of agency reinterpretation.1 74 So long as
the doctrinal mandates of Chevron and Mead are met, a later in-
terpretation by an agency controls over a prior-and otherwise
precedential--decision by a court.
7
1
Of course, room still existed for the tax exceptionalism debate
after Mead and Brand X, although this argument was increasingly
coming under scrutiny. Neither Mead nor Brand X addressed
Treasury regulations specifically, or the Department's unique di-
chotomy of legislative and interpretive regulations.176 The argu-
ments for and against tax exceptionalism in the deference arena
were wide and varied, and existed both amongst scholars and
practitioners and throughout the courts.77  Lower federal courts
and the Tax Court stated varying opinions as to whether Chevron
or National Muffler articulated the proper standard for judicial
deference to Treasury regulations.7 8 These courts stated at vari-
ous points that National Muffler was the correct standard, 179 that
Chevron would apply to all Treasury regulations, 0 and that Chev-




The circuit courts, in turn, exacerbated the deference dilemma.
Prior to 2011, Chevron definitely applied to § 7805(a) Treasury
regulations in the Sixth Circuit,' whereas National Muffler was
the standard de jure in the Eighth Circuit. 83  Still other courts
determined that Chevron and National Muffler were indistin-
174. Id. The Court explained that a contrary rule would "mean that whether an
agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute is entitled to Chevron deference would turn
on the order in which the interpretations issue," and that such a rule would produce
anomalous and improper results, because "whether Congress has delegated to an agency
the authority to interpret a statute does not depend on the order in which the judicial and
administrative constructions occur." Id. at 983.
175. Id. at 985.
176. Hickman, supra note 144, at 1539-40 (discussing competing applications of the
judicial deference doctrine post-Mead).
177. See Snowa v. Comm'r, 123 F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 1997) (specific authority regula-
tions given "controlling weight" under Chevron, while general authority regulations given
.considerable weight" under National Muffler); see ,e.g., Salem, Aprill & Galler, supra note
96, at 724-25 (recommending Chevron deference for specific authority regulations but in-
corporating the National Muffler analysis for general authority regulations).
178. See, e.g., Snowa, 123 F.3d at 197.
179. Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r., 126 T.C. 96, 96-97 (2006), vacated, 515 F.3d 162
(2008).
180. Square D. Co. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 299, 307 (2002), aff'd, 438 F.3d
739 (2006).
181. Cent. Pa. Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 384, 390-92 (1995), supplemented by
T.C.M. 1996-172 (1996).
182. Hosp. Corp. of Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 348 F.3d 136, 140-41 (6th Cir. 2003).
183. Snowa, 123 F.3d at 197.
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guishable."' Scholarly writing was in similar discord, both as to
which standard actually applied and which standard was prefer-
able.'85 The United States Supreme Court, until 2011, routinely
cited both Chevron and National Muffler in judicial deference/tax
cases, without providing further illumination as to which standard
governed the review of tax regulations. 186  Only recently did the
Supreme Court seek to finally answer the question of whether
Chevron should apply in tax cases-and with its decision in Mayo,
delivered a devastating blow to the tax exceptionalists.
3. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v.
United States
Mayo'87 involved judicial review of Treasury regulations inter-
preting the Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA"), enacted
by Congress to collect funds for Social Security.'88 Under the
statutory scheme, "students" are exempted from FICA taxes.189
The Social Security Act contains a corresponding student excep-
tion materially identical to the FICA definition.9 ° The question
presented to the Mayo Court was whether doctors who serve as
medical residents are properly classified as students for FICA
'9'
purposes.
184. See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978-83 (7th Cir.
1998) (concluding that, despite some differences, the two standards were virtually indistin-
guishable); Norwest Corp. v. Comm'r, 69 F.3d 1404, 1408-09 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing both
Chevron and National Muffler as support for deference to Treasury regulations); Cent. Pa.
Sav., 104 T.C. at 390-92 (finding the differences between the two standards to be negligi-
ble).
185. Compare Edward J. Schnee & W. Eugene Seago, Deference Issues in the Tax Law:
Mead Clarifies the Chevron Rule-Or Does It? 96 J. TAX'N 366, 371-72 (2002) (arguing that
general authority Treasury regulations should only be granted a less-than-mandatory
degree of deference based on the regulation's "reasonableness"), with Hickman, supra note
144 (addressing the normative and doctrinal cases for applying Chevron to all Treasury
regulations and rejecting the National Muffler alternative).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001)
(citing Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979)); Cottage Sav.
Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1991); United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246
(1985) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984));
see also Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 523 U.S. 382, 387-89 (1998) (citing Cottage Savings
Ass'n, 499 U.S. 554 (utilizing Nat'l Muffler, 440 U.S. 472)); Chevron, 467 U.S. 837).
187. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
188. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 708.
189. I.R.C. § 3121(b)(10) (2006). Under this provision, Congress excluded from taxation
.service performed in the employ of... a school, college, or university .. , if such service is
performed by a student who is enrolled and regularly attending classes at such school,
college, or university." Id.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(10) (2006).
191. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 708.
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Since 1951, the Treasury Department had applied the student
exception to exempt from taxation students who work for their
schools "as an incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a course
of study."'92 The Treasury had determined whether an individual's
work was incident to his studies on a case-by-case basis until
2005.93 The Social Security Administration ("SSA") had adopted a
similar approach in its regulations interpreting the corresponding
exception to the Social Security Act.' However, the SSA explic-
itly held the view that resident physicians do not qualify as stu-
dents. 
1 95
In 1998, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the SSA's
categorical exclusion of medical residents from the definition of
student was unsustainable, given that its regulations provided for
a case-by-case approach.'9 6 Following the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeal's guidance, more than 7,000 claims were filed with the
IRS, seeking FICA tax refunds on the grounds that medical resi-
dents qualified as students under the essentially identical §
3121(b)(10) of the I.R.C.
197
Prompted by this immense number of claims, the Treasury de-
termined that it would be necessary to issue regulations "clarify-
ing" the meaning of the term student as used in § 3121(b)(10)
9
8
The Treasury submitted an amended rule for comment and held a
public hearing on the proposed rule.9 9 After the notice-and-
comment period, the Treasury Department adopted an amended
rule effectively excluding medical residents from the definition of
"student" under FICA.2"' Subsequent to the promulgation of this
192. Id. at 709 (quoting Bureau of Internal Revenue, Department of the Treasury, 16
Fed. Reg. 12,474 (Dec. 12, 1951)); see Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d) (2011).
193. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 709. The primary considerations in the factual analysis were
the number of hours worked and the course load taken. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 78-17, 1978-1
C.B. 306).
194. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1028(c) (1998).
195. SSR 78-3, 1978 SSR LEXIS 15 (1978).
196. Minnesota v. Apfel, 151 F.3d 742, 747-48 (1998).
197. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 709.
198. Student FICA Exception, 69 Fed. Reg. 8604-01, 8,605 (Feb. 25, 2004).
199. Student FICA Exception, 69 Fed. Reg. 76404-01, 76,405 (Dec. 21, 2004). In other
words, the Treasury abided by the terms of the APA_ Id.
200. The amended regulation provides that an employee's service is "incident" to his
studies only when "[tihe educational aspect of the relationship between the employer and
the employee, as compared to the service aspect of the relationship, [is] predominant."
Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(i) (2005). The rule also provides that "[tihe services of a
full-time employee"-as defined by the employer's policies, but in any event including any
employee normally scheduled to work forty or more hours per week-"are not incident to
and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study." Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(iii).
As an example, the regulation includes the case of "Employee E," who is employed by "Uni-
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rule, Mayo Foundation filed suit seeking a refund of the money it
had withheld and paid on its residents' stipends during the second
quarter of 2005, asserting that its residents were exempt as stu-
dents and that the new Treasury regulation was invalid.0'
The District Court of Minnesota granted summary judgment in
Mayo Foundation's favor, finding that the regulation was inconsis-
tent with the unambiguous text of § 3121, which the court inter-
preted as dictating that "an employee is a 'student' so long as the
educational aspect of his service predominates over the service
aspect of the relationship with his employer."2 ' The district court
then applied the National Muffler factors to invalidate the regula-
tion. °3 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, determining
that Chevron, not National Muffler, should guide the analysis.0 4
Because I.R.C. § 3121(b)(10) is silent or ambiguous on the issue of
whether a medical resident working full-time qualifies as a stu-
dent and the amended Treasury regulation constituted a permis-
sible interpretation of the Code provision, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that both steps of Chevron were met and the
regulation was enforced.20 '
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Mayo by announcing
the two-step framework of Chevron and asked whether Congress
directly addressed the precise question at issue-i.e., whether
medical residents are subject to FICA taxes.26 The Court found
that Congress had not done so.20 7 In the Court's view, the statu-
tory text did not speak with the precision necessary to state de-
finitively whether the exemption applies to medical residents.208
versity V" as a medical resident. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(e) ex 4. Because Em-
ployee's E's "normal work schedule calls for [him] to perform services 40 hours or more per
week," the regulation provides that his service is "not incident to and for the purpose of
pursuing a course of study .... " Id. Thus, Employee E, like all medical residents, would
not be an exempt student under I.R.C. § 3121(b)(10) (West 2010).
201. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 2d. 1164 (D.
Minn. 2007), rev'd, 568 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2009), affd, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
202. Id. at 1175.
203. Id. at 1176 (citing Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472
(1979)).
204. Mayo, 568 F.3d at 679-84.
205. Id.
206. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 708, 711
(2011).
207. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 711 (quoting OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY 2049-50 (3d ed.
1955)). The Court rejected the taxpayer's assertion that the dictionary definition of stu-
dent-one "who engages in study by applying the mind to the acquisition of learning"-
necessarily encompasses residents. Id.
208. Id. Thus, the Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the case should be re-
solved at Chevron step one for lack of statutory ambiguity. Id.
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The Court then declared its intention to turn to Chevron step
two.2°9 Before doing so, however, the Court addressed the tax-
payer's argument that National Muffler, rather than Chevron,
should govern the Court's standard of review, since the ambiguous
statute at issue was contained within the I.R.C. 210 The Court ac-
knowledged that, since deciding Chevron, it had cited both Chev-
211ron and National Muffler when reviewing Treasury regulations.
However, aside from past citations to National Muffler, the Court
found that the taxpayer had advanced no "justification for apply-
ing a less deferential standard of review to Treasury Department
regulations than.. . to the rules of any other agency."212 Thus, the
Court refused to "carve out an approach of administrative review
good for tax law only."212
Instead, the Court explicitly held that the principles of Chevron
applied with full force in the tax context. 24 This holds true even
for Treasury regulations (such as the FICA regulations at issue)
that are promulgated under the general authority contained in
I.R.C. § 7805(a).1 The Mead inquiry, i.e., whether a regulation
was promulgated in the exercise of authority and carries the force
of law, does not turn on whether Congress's delegation of author-
ity was general or specific.2 6 The authority to "prescribe all need-
ful rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the I.R.C.217 is the
type of explicit Congressional delegation of authority that is re-
quired by Mead."' Thus, regulations issued pursuant to this dele-
gation of authority merit Chevron deference. 9
Critically, the Court then addressed the procedures utilized by
the Treasury when it issued Treasury Regulation § 31.3121(b)(10)-
2(e), as follows:
209. Id. at 711.
210. Id. at 712. That is, the Court answered the question posed by tax exceptionalists-
whether Treasury regulations are inherently distinct from other bodies of administrative
law, such that an entirely different standard of review should be applied. Id.
211. Id. at 712.
212. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713.
213. Id. The Court stated that filling gaps in the I.R.C. required the Treasury to make
complex interpretive choices, and Chevron stood for the proposition that agencies are better
equipped than courts to make these types of judgments. Id.
214. Id. at 713.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 713-14.
217. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713 (quoting I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012)).




The Department issued the full-time employee rule only after
notice and comment procedures, 69 Fed. Reg. 76405, again a
consideration identified in our precedents as a "significant"
sign that a rule merits Chevron deference. We have explained
that "the ultimate question is whether Congress would have
intended, and expected, courts to treat [the regulation] as
within, or outside, its delegation to the agency of 'gap-filling'
authority."... Chevron provide[s] the appropriate standard of
review "[w]here an agency rule sets forth important individ-
ual rights and duties, where the agency focuses fully and di-
rectly upon the issue, where the agency uses full notice-and-
comment procedures to promulgate a rule, [and] where the re-
sulting rule falls within the statutory grant of authority."22 '
The method of promulgation thus played an important role in
the Court's consideration of the regulation's validity. Based on
these considerations, the Court found that the regulation "easily"
satisfied step two of Chevron.22' The Treasury reasonably sought a
way to define students under FICA, and this reasonable construc-
tion is entitled to deference under Chevron and Mead.222 The
Court's decision did not state any view on whether a regulation
which had not been promulgated in an appropriate manner would
be entitled to the same level of deference. However, the Court's
statements regarding the significance of the notice-and-comment
process certainly leaves room for argument that an APA-violative
regulation would not be afforded the same treatment as one that
was enacted in accordance with the APA.
C. The Current Question: What's an Omission, Anyway?
The question posed is likely purely academic, and the answer is
one that doesn't make much of a difference.223 However, when ask-
220. Id. (citations omitted).
221. Id.
222. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 715-16.
223. Quite simply, the issue to be explored at length, infra-whether an artificially
inflated basis in property triggers a three or six year statute of limitations for asserting a
deficiency action--doesn't really matter anymore. In 2004, Congress amended the I.R.C.'s
statute of limitations provision, 26 I.R.C. § 6501 (West 2010), by adding a new subsection,
(c)(10). American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 ("AJCA"), Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 814(a), 118
Stat. 1418, 1581 (codified as amended at 26 I.R.C. § 6501(c)(10)). This subsection provides
that in the case of a "listed transaction," such as that which occurred in Home Concrete and
the other related cases, the limitations period for assessing tax does not expire until one
year after the taxpayer submits certain information. Id. If a taxpayer fails to furnish the
required information, the limitations period remains open indefinitely. Id. I.R.C. §
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ing the question, "does an overstated basis result in an omission
from gross income," please keep in mind the age-old maxim that
224
what matters is not the destination; it is the journey.
The journey that led from a taxpayer audit to a Supreme Court
showdown which has the tax world on the edge of its seat is the
focus of the remainder of this article. The current jurisprudential
saga began when the IRS and taxpayers disagreed over the mean-
ing of "omits from gross income" contained in I.R.C. § 6501(e).225
The impetus for this disagreement stems from the fact that when
a taxpayer omits a significant item of gross income in his return,
the IRS has a six year window in which to bring a deficiency ac-
tion against that taxpayer.226 Otherwise, the IRS is subject to a
three year statute of limitations on any deficiency action.227
When a taxpayer overstates his basis in an item of property, the
tax liability upon the subsequent sale or exchange of that item will
be understated.228 If the IRS catches this understatement on au-
dit, the government can bring a deficiency action against the tax-
payer.229 As happened in Home Concrete and the related cases, the
IRS caught this understatement sometime between three and six
years after the taxpayers submitted their returns.23 Thus, it was
critical for the government to convince the courts that the six year
statute of limitations should apply. And although the end result is
no longer critical, the manner in which the government went
about its mission implicates Chevron, the APA, fundamental no-
tions of judicial fairness, and the constitutional balance of gov-
ernmental powers."' And who said tax law wasn't exciting?
6501(c)(10) has been effective since 2004; thus, while it cannot be applied to the transac-
tions depicted in this Article, it certainly applies henceforth to all similar transactions.
224. This maxim is attributed to Ralph Waldo Emerson. Ralph Waldo Emerson Quotes,
GOODREADS, http://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/12080.RalphWaldoEmerson (last
visited Aug. 27, 2012).
225. See infra text accompanying notes 248-51.
226. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A). "Significant" means an amount in excess of 25 percent of the
taxpayer's total gross income stated in his return. Id. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i).
227. Id. § 6501(a).
228. See supra note 23.
229. I.R.C. § 6212(a).
230. See infra note 239.
231. As Professor Hickman describes it in her Amicus Brief to the Supreme Court, "this
is a case about the power of the federal government agencies to define the parameters of
the laws that they administer, the limitations that Congress has imposed on agencies as
they exercise that power, and the role of the courts in policing agency action." Brief of
Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hickman in Support of Respondents at 3, United States
v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-139), 2011 WL 6813230 at
*3.
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1. Home Concrete--The One to Reach the Big Stage
In 2012, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Home Con-
crete & Supply, LLC.232 The Home Concrete case is representative
of a line of cases that first appeared in front of the Tax Court in
2007.23' A quick summary of the facts of Home Concrete is repre-
sentative of the entire line of cases and will suffice to provide con-
text for the pertinent judicial deference issues.
The taxpayer-plaintiffs in Home Concrete engaged in a classic
son-of-BOSS tax shelter plan.2 34  An overview of the taxpayers'
business dealings will provide more clarity to the issues at stake
than would a full reiteration of the details of their transactions.
The plan began when one of the owners of a business, Home Oil &
Company, wanted to sell his share of the company while minimiz-
ing his tax liability.2 35  In order to accomplish this, the owner
transferred his business assets from the corporation to a newly-
formed partnership, inflated his basis in the partnership236 by
short-selling Treasury bonds,237 then sold his interest in the part-
nership at a much lower gain than he would have, had he simply
sold his original interest in the corporation.238 Of course, reporting
232. 132 S. Ct. 1836.
233. See Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm'r., 128 T.C. 207 (2007), affd, 568
F.3d 767 (2009).
234. These tax shelters have now been expressly forbidden by the IRS and any users or
promoters of such transactions are subject to various penalties. I.R.S. Notice 2000-44,
2000-2 C.B. 255.
235. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 2011),
affd, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
236. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 251 & n.2. A partner's basis in his partnership interest
is referred to as "outside basis," whereas a partnership's basis in its assets is known as
"inside basis." See I.R.C. §§ 722-23 (2011).
237. A short sale is a "sale of a security that the seller does not own or has not con-
tracted for at the time of sale, and that the seller must borrow to make delivery." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1456 (9th ed. 2009). To close the short sale, "'Itihe short seller is obli-
gated . . .to buy an equivalent number of shares [or substantially identical security] in
order to return the borrowed [property]. In theory, the short seller makes this covering
purchase using the funds he received from selling the borrowed [property].'" Kornman &
Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443, 450 (5th Cir. 2008). After utilizing these short
sales, the partner was able to artificially increase his basis in the partnership by "stepping
up" his basis under I.R.C. § 743(b)(1), which reads:
In the case of a transfer of an interest in a partnership by sale or exchange or upon
the death of a partner, a partnership with respect to which the election provided in
section 754 is in effect or which has a substantial built-in loss immediately after such
transfer shall
(1) increase the adjusted basis of the partnership property by the excess of the basis
to the transferee partner of his interest in the partnership over his proportionate
share of the adjusted basis of the partnership property ....
I.R.C. § 743(b)(1), quoted in Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 252.
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a lower gain meant paying less tax on that gain.239 The only prob-
lem, in the government's eyes, was that none of the transactions-- • 240
undertaken by the taxpayer had any real economic substance.
The tax return reported the basic components of the transac-
tion, and the IRS did not investigate until June of 2003.241 On
September 7, 2006, the IRS issued a Final Partnership Adminis-
trative Adjustment ("FPAA") to Home Concrete.242  The FPAA de-
creased the taxpayers' reported outside bases in Home Concrete to
zero, finding that the short sale and subsequent sales lacked eco-
nomic substance and were sham transactions. This substan
tially increased the taxpayers' respective taxable income for
1999.24' Home Concrete deposited over $1 million with the IRS
and sued in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina to recover the deposit.245 The basis of Home Con-
crete's refund action was that the FPAA was barred by the three
year statute of limitations contained in I.R.C. § 6501(a).246  The
IRS countered by arguing that the six year statute of limitations
in I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(a), not the three year default limitations
statute, should apply under this set of facts.
247
236. The taxpayer-plaintiffs were able to sell a $10 million company and report less than
$100,000 in gain, by utilizing the short sales of Treasury bonds to increase their basis in
the property. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 252; see also I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, supra note
234.
239. See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
240. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 252.
241. Id.
242. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 6223 (defining and explaining the procedure for issuing an
FPAA).
243. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 252. The FPAA detailed that:
[Tihe purported partnership was formed and availed of solely for purposes of tax
avoidance by artificially overstating basis in the partnership interests of its pur-
ported partners.... [T]he acquisition of any interest in the purported partnership by
the purported partner, short sales of Treasury Notes, the transfer of proceeds from
short sales of Treasury Notes or other assets to a partnership in return for a partner-
ship interest, the purchase or disposition of assets by the partnership, and the distri-
bution of those assets or proceeds from the disposition of those assets to the pur-
ported partners, and the subsequent sale of those assets to generate a loss, all within
a period of 8 months, had no business purpose other than tax avoidance, lacked eco-
nomic substance, and, in fact and substance, constitutes an economic sham for fed-
eral income tax purposes. Accordingly, the partnership and the transactions de-
scribed above shall be disregarded in full and (1) any purported losses resulting from
these transactions are not allowable as deductions; and (2) increases in basis of as-
sets are not allowed to eliminate gain for federal income tax purposes.
Id.
244. Id. The total taxable income increase was $1,392,118. Id.
245. Id. at 252-53.
246. Id. at 253.
247. Id.
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Thus, the legal crux of Home Concrete centered on which limita-
tions period should apply; the longer limitations period applies
when a taxpayer "omits from gross income an amount properly
includable" and the omitted item exceeds 25 percent of the amount
of gross income stated in that taxpayer's return.24 s The ultimate
decision in Home Concrete, therefore, turned on whether an over-
stated basis constitutes an omission from gross income.249 After
the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
the IRS,"' the taxpayer appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, arguing that a prior Supreme Court decision fore-
closed the lower court's interpretation of "omi[ssion] from gross
income.25'
In their argument to the circuit court, the taxpayers argued that
the Supreme Court's decision in Colony Inc. v. Commissioner
should control the outcome of the litigation,2"2 a case in which the
Court addressed whether an overstated basis should constitute an
omission from gross income.2 2 The 1939 version of the I.R.C. was
in effect at the time of Colony, and the extended statute of limita-
tions provision was contained in I.R.C.§ 275(c). 25 4 After examining
the language of § 275(c), the Court found this provision to be am-
biguous, and as such, the text did not clearly answer whether
Congress intended an overstated basis to constitute an omission
from gross income.255
Turning then to the legislative history of § 275(c), the Court
found that the purpose of the extended statute of limitations was
to assist the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who would be at a
disadvantage when an item had actually been omitted from a tax-
payer's return.256 An overstatement of basis, on the other hand,
248. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) (2011).
249. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 253. There is no dispute that, if the overstated basis
constitutes an omission from gross income, such omission would exceed 25 percent of the
taxpayers' stated gross income for 1999. Id.
250. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 2d 678, 690 (E.D.N.C.
2008), rev'd, 634 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2011), affd, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
251. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 253.
252. Id.
253. Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28 (1958)).
254. Colony, 357 U.S. at 29 n.1 (citing I.R.C. § 275(c) (1939)). This provision called for a
five year statute of limitations for the IRS to bring a deficiency action when a taxpayer
omits an item from gross income. Id.
255. Id. at 33.
256. Id. at 36.
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does not pose this same problem.25 ' Therefore, the Court refused
to interpret "omit" broadly.258
Critical to the taxpayers' argument in Home Concrete, the Col-
ony Court stated in dicta that its holding was in harmony with the
unambiguous language of I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A).29  Citing this
dicta, the circuit court in Home Concrete agreed that the current
I.R.C. limitations provision is unambiguous, and therefore, an
overstated basis is no more an omission from gross income in to-
day's tax landscape than it was at the time of Colony.260
And this is where the IRS decided to press a new path-a path
which leads directly to the question of Chevron deference.26' On
September 28, 2009, the Treasury had promulgated a temporary
regulation, which became final during the pendency of the Home
Concrete appeal.262 This regulation, directly aimed at influencing
the outcome of the Home Concrete line of cases, provides:
(a) Income taxes --(1) General rule. (i) If a taxpayer omits
from the gross income stated in the return of a tax imposed by
subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code an amount properly
includible therein that is in excess of 25 percent of the gross
income so stated, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in
court for the collection of that tax may be begun without as-
sessment, at any time within 6 years after the return was
filed....
(iii) For purposes of paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section, the
term gross income, as it relates to any income other than from
the sale of goods or services in a trade or business, has the
257. Id. From a common sense perspective, when a taxpayer has included an item of
gain within his return, even where the gain is understated, it is possible for an examiner to
investigate the propriety of the reported gain on audit with the information that has been
provided. This is, of course, distinct from a situation where nothing has been reported, and
the examiner, therefore, would not be alerted as to the need for further investigation.
258. Id. at 36-37.
259. Colony, 357 U.S. at 37. The district court in Home Concrete distinguished Colony
on the ground that its holding is limited to cases in which the taxpayer is a trade or busi-
ness selling goods or services. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 599 F.
Supp. 2d 678, 685-86 (E.D.N.C. 2008), rev'd, 649 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2011), affid, 132 S. Ct.
1836 (2012). The appellate court dismissed this reasoning. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC
v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 255 (4th Cir. 2011), affd, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
260. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 255 ("[W]e hold that the Supreme Court in Colony
straightforwardly construed the phrase 'omits from gross income,' unhinged from any de-
pendency on the taxpayer's identity as a trade or business selling goods or services. ...
Colony forecloses the argument that Home Concrete's overstated basis in its reporting of
the short sale proceeds resulted in an omission from its reported gross income.").
261. Id.
262. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-i (2010)).
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same meaning as provided under section 61(a) [26 USCS §
61(a)], and includes the total of the amounts received or ac-
crued, to the extent required to be shown on the return. In
the case of amounts received or accrued that relate to the dis-
position of property, and except as provided in paragraph
(a)(1)(ii) of this section, gross income means the excess of the
amount realized from the disposition of the property over the
unrecovered cost or other basis of the property. Consequently,
except as provided in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, an
understated amount of gross income resulting from an over-
statement of unrecovered cost or other basis constitutes an
omission from gross income for purposes of [I.R.C.] section
6501(e)(1)(A)(i).
263
Quite simply, this new regulation overturned the Colony rule
and explicitly included an overstatement of basis within the defi-
nition of an omission from gross income.264 Although Brand X
makes clear that an agency may overturn prior judicial interpre-
tations of ambiguous statutes through the issuance of contrary
regulations, the Treasury did not follow proper procedure when it
promulgated Treasury Regulation § 301.6501(e)-1.
26
1
Predictably, the taxpayers mounted numerous challenges to the
application of this new regulation. As a preliminary matter, the
taxpayers debated whether the regulation could be applied to their
case at all, considering that the regulation was not in effect when
263. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-1 (emphasis added).
264. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 255-56.
265. See supra text accompanying note 168. In September 2009, the Treasury issued
and published in the Federal Register and Internal Revenue Bulletin a temporary but
legally binding regulation, Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-lT (2009). See T.D. 9466, 2009-
43 I.R.B. 551. Simultaneously, the Treasury issued and published a notice of proposed
rulemaking containing nearly identical regulatory language as the temporary regulation
and then entertained public comment. See Definition of Omission from Gross Income, 74
Fed. Reg. 49,354 (Sept. 28, 2009). In December 2010, the Treasury withdrew the tempo-
rary regulation and published the virtually identical final regulation. See Definition of
Omission from Gross Income, 75 Fed. Reg. 78,897 (Dec. 17, 2010). As explained in notes
107 through 110, supra, and accompanying text, the promulgation of temporary regulations
concurrent with notices of proposed rulemaking violates the APA, because post-
promulgation notice-and-comment is not a valid substitute for statutorily required pre-
promulgation notice-and-comment. The Treasury did not provide any justification for its
failure to abide by the APA sufficient to meet one of the exceptions to APA § 553, merely
stating that APA § 553(b) "does not apply to these regulations." Id. at 78898; T.D. 9466,
2009-43 I.R.B. 551. Thus, the procedures employed by the Treasury in promulgating Treas.
Reg. § 301.6501(e)-i indisputably violated the Administrative Procedure Act.
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the transactions at issue occurred. 66 Although the regulation was
promulgated after the transaction in Home Concrete took place,
the IRS argued that it should still be applied to the Home Concrete
case, because the IRS issued its FPAA within six years of the
transaction.267 Whether application of this regulation would in-
volve an impermissible retroactive reach was considered in Home
Concrete,26 but a thorough analysis of this issue is beyond the
scope of this Article.
Assuming that the regulation can properly be applied to the
transaction at issue, the question remains open as to whether the
regulation should be afforded Chevron deference. The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that it should not, because
I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)-the statute which the regulation purports
to interpret-is unambiguous.269  Thus, Chevron step one is not
satisfied.27 ° The court was unimpressed by the IRS's argument
that Brand X controls the inquiry. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals did not base its holding on stare decisis faithfulness to the
Supreme Court's prior interpretation in Colony.271 In fact, the
Home Concrete court acknowledged that subsequent agency inter-
pretation (here, Treasury Regulation § 301.6501(e)-i) could dis-
place an earlier judicial construction of the same statute (here,
266. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 256. The express applicability date of the regulation
was "taxable years with respect to which the period for assessing tax was open on or before
September 24, 2009." Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-l(e). The tax year at issue in Home Con-
crete was 1999. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 256.
267. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 256 The IRS urged a different interpretation of the
regulation's applicability clause than the straightforward interpretation which would result
in a clear finding that the regulation did not apply to the tax year 1999. Id. The IRS's
interpretation can be found in the preamble to Treasury Decision 9511, which promulgated
the regulation. Id. (citing T.D. 9511, 2011-6 I.R.B. 455). In this preamble, the Treasury
suggests that "the six-year period for assessing tax" in § 6501(e)(1) remains open for "all
taxable years . . . that are the subject of any case pending before any court of competent
jurisdiction... in which a decision had not yet become final...." Id. (quoting T.D. 9511,
2011-6 I.R.B. 455). Because the Home Concrete case was not finally resolved as of Septem-
ber 24, 2009, according to the logic of the preamble, the period for assessing tax remained
open and Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-i would apply. Id. at 256. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit found that this was an impermissible attempt to redraft the limitations
statute of § 6501. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 256-57
(4th Cir. 2011) ("[Tlhe IRS's argument that the period for assessing tax is open-or indeed
may be re-opened, as would be the case here-so long as litigation is pending is contrary to
the clearly and unambiguously expressed intent of Congress and must fail."), at 'd, 132 S.
Ct. 1836 (2012).
268. Id. at 256-57.
269. Id. at 257.




Colony), assuming that the statute was ambiguous." However,
the court stated that the regulation was not interpreting an am-
biguous statute, but rather was attempting to change the govern-
ing statutory law by impermissibly altering Congress's express
intent.273
In a concurring opinion, Judge Wilkinson explained the policy
rationale behind the court's decision.274 Judge Wilkinson recog-
nized that Chevron and Brand X afford agencies "considerable dis-
cretion in their areas of expertise."275 However, Judge Wilkerson
continued:
Yet it remains the case that agencies are not a law unto
themselves. No less than any other organ of government,
they operate in a system in which the law words in law belong
to Congress and the Supreme Court. What the IRS seeks to
do in extending the statutory limitations period goes against
what I believe are the plain instructions of Congress, which
have not been changed, and the plain words of the Court,
which have not been retracted.276
Judge Wilkerson concluded that the agency had exceeded the
point of expert, beneficial agency guidance and crossed the line
into arbitrariness when it issued Treasury Regulation §
301.6501(e)-1.
2 77
Not to be so easily deterred, the government filed its petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court on August 3, 2011,278 which was
subsequently granted. 279 The government posed two questions for
the Court's review: first, whether an understatement of gross in-
come attributable to an overstatement of basis in sold property is
an omission from gross income that can trigger the extended six
year statute of limitations; and second, whether the final regula-
tion promulgated by the Treasury is entitled to judicial defer-
280ence.
272. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2011),
affd, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
273. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 257-58.
274. Id. at 258-60 (Wilkerson, J., concurring).
275. Id. at 259.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC,
132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-139), 2011 WL 3349349.
279. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 71 (2012) (mem.).
280. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 278, at *I.
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The taxpayers responded and requested that the Court deny
certiorari." ' The taxpayers' opening brief argued that the Colony
decision is controlling per absence of statutory ambiguity.282 Be-
yond the mechanical application of Chevron step one, however, the
taxpayers argued that deference should not be granted for policy
reasons. 1 3 First, the regulation at issue was used in an attempt to
"guarantee a win" for the IRS, rather than to truly issue interpre-
tive guidance for taxpayers.2" Moreover, the taxpayers argued
that the regulation is not entitled to Chevron deference, because
unlike the judicial construction of the statute at play in Brand X,
the Supreme Court's interpretation in Colony was the only per-
missible reading of the statute, rather than just the "best" read-
ing.285 Finally, the taxpayers argue in their merit brief that the
regulation is procedurally defective and that it also fails Chevron
step two.1
86
2. The Rest of the Overstated Bases Cases-Inconsistency
Reigns Supreme
The Fourth Circuit was not the only appellate court to address
the meaning of "omits from gross income" or to apply the Chevron
doctrine to Treasury Regulation 301.6501(e)-i. In fact, these pre-
cise issues have been decided by the District of Columbia 287 Fed-
eral,28 8 Fifth, 28gSeventh,29°and Ninth291 Circuit Courts of Appeal.
281. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 33, United States v. Home
Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-139).
282. Id. at 8-33. Under Chevron step one, the taxpayers argued, the statute at issue
relative to an omission from gross income is unambiguous and leaves no room for agency
interpretation. Id. at 30.
283. Id. at 26-29.
284. Id. at 27. On a related note, the regulation changes the law that was settled by the
Supreme Court in Colony more than fifty years prior to the regulation's promulgation-
thereby belying the government's claim that its regulation was a mere "clarification" of
statutory intent. See id.
285. Id. at 30-32.
286. See Brief of Respondents at 49-50, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC,
132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-139). This issue is more fully developed in an Amicus Curiae
brief filed by Professor Hickman on behalf of the taxpayers-respondents. See infra note
329.
287. Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Comm'r, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir.
2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012) (mem.); UTAM, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 645 F.3d 415 (D.C.
Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2100 (2012) (mem.).
288. Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132
S. Ct. 2099 (2012) (mem.).
289. Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2011).
290. Beard v. Comm'r, 633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012)
(mem.).
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The results reached by the circuits have been anything but consis-
tent.
The District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit") decided Inter-
mountain Insurance Service of Vail, L.L.C. v. Commissioner in
June of 2011.292 Like Home Concrete, this was another inflated
basis case with an FPAA that would be considered timely under a
six year statute of limitations, but untimely under a three year
limitations period.292 After the Tax Court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the taxpayers, the Treasury promulgated the
temporary regulation.294 The IRS moved for reconsideration in the
Tax Court.295 The Tax Court denied reconsideration, finding that
the statute of limitations had expired before the regulation's effec-
tive date, and that, even if the time period had not expired, Colony
unambiguously foreclosed the Treasury's interpretation of "omits
from gross income."296
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit explored in detail the background of
Colony and the legislative history of the 1954 Code in order to jus-
tify its conclusion that I.R.C. § 6501 does not unambiguously pro-
vide that overstatements of basis do not trigger the six year stat-
ute-even though the same statutory term "omission from gross
income" in the 1939 Code was construed in Colony not to include
such overstatements.297 Rather, the D.C. Circuit explained that
Colony did not stand for the proposition that § 6501(e)(1)(A) was
unambiguous in its entirety, as this would contradict its earlier
statement that the similarly-worded § 275(c) was ambiguous.9 A
more logical reading of Colony, according to the D.C. Circuit, is
that the Court found only subsection (i) of § 6501(e)(1)(A), and not
the entire section, to be unambiguous.2 9
291. Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm'r, 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2009).
292. Intermountain, 650 F.3d 691.
293. Id. at 695.
294. Id. at 696.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Intermountain, 650 F.3d at 696-700.
298. Id. at 702-03.
299. Id. at 703. The Intermountain taxpayer urged the court that the statement made
by the Colony Court--"the conclusion we reach [about the meaning of section 275(c)i is in
harmony with the unambiguous language of [section] 6501(e)(1)(A)"-referred to the prin-
cipal paragraph of § 6501(e)(1)(A), i.e., the section referring to omission from gross income.
Id. at 702-703 (quoting Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 37 (1958)). However, the D.C.
Circuit noted that subsection (i) of § 6501(e)(1)(A) (redefining gross income to mean gross
receipts) is "certainly unambiguous," and therefore, a more sensible reading of the Colony
opinion is that the Court was referring only to that subsection, and not the entire section.
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Continuing with Chevron step one, the D.C. Circuit found that
the phrase "omits from gross income" is at least ambiguous, if not
best read to include basis overstatements."' Finding that Chevron
step one was satisfied, the court then stated that the Chevron step
two analysis is "easy," because the only argument against reason-
ableness is that the Treasury's new interpretation conflicts with
Colony, which the court already found not to be controlling.3' In
passing, the D.C. Circuit addressed the APA. °2 However, the
court did not searchingly examine the Treasury's violation of APA
mandates-rather, the court expressed the opinion that the Com-
missioner underwent "searching consideration" of the comment
that was presented after the temporary regulation was promul-
gated.'0 3 This, the court found, was enough to warrant judicial
deference.' 4
The Federal Circuit's decision in Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v.
United States ° was the first case to squarely address the defer-
ence question as applied to Treasury Regulation § 301.6501(e)-i.
At the trial level, the Court of Federal Claims had relied on Col-
ony and found that it controlled, thereby denying the govern-
ment's claim.0 6 The timing of Grapevine, however, put the judicial
deference question front and center, as oral arguments in Grape-
Id. at 703. This finding, of course, leaves room for a determination that the remainder of §
6501(e)(1)(A) is ambiguous-a necessary prerequisite to Chevron deference.
300. Id. at 703-705.
301. Id. at 707.
302. Intermountain, 650 F.3d at 709 ("Here, the Commissioner simultaneously issued
immediately effective temporary regulations and a notice of proposed rulemaking for iden-
tical final regulations and then held a 90-day comment period before finalizing the regula-
tions. According to [taxpayers], that procedure, although typical of the Commissioner's
practice, violates the Administrative Procedure Act, thus requiring an open-mindedness
inquiry.").
303. Id. at 709-10. The court found that because the Commissioner only received one
comment upon publication of the temporary regulations and did respond to such comment
(albeit by expressing disagreement with the comment and changing nothing in the regula-
tions), the final regulations were validly promulgated. Id. at 710.
304. Id. at 710.
305. Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132
S. Ct. 2099 (2012) (mem.).
306. Grapevine Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505, 511-12 (2007), rev'd, 636
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012) (mem.). Before appellate brief-
ing began in Grapevine, Grapevine moved to have the appeal consolidated with another Son
of BOSS case, Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009), which
was then pending before another Federal Circuit panel. Grapevine, 636 F.3d at 1374. The
Grapevine panel denied consolidation, but agreed to stay the proceedings until Salman
Ranch was decided. Id. In Salman Ranch, the Federal Circuit Panel ruled that the gov-
ernment's case was time-barred. Id. Shortly after Salman Ranch was decided, the Treas-
ury issued the temporary regulation, implementing the Department's interpretation of the
statute of limitations and the statute's interaction with Colony. Id. at 1374-75.
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vine were held one day after the Supreme Court decided Mayo."7
The government quickly embraced Mayo's affirmation of the legal
weight afforded to Treasury regulations, arguing that it compelled
judicial deference to the new regulation. °8 The Federal Circuit
agreed, finding that "the new Treasury regulations are entitled to
deference in interpreting the statutory language, and . . .under
the regulations' interpretation, the government's case is not time-
barred.""9
In Chevron step one, the Federal Circuit found that Congress's
intent when enacting § 6501(e)(1)(A) was not so clear as to fore-
close reinterpretation.310 If more than one reasonable interpreta-
tion of Congress's intent can be made, then the agency, not the
judiciary, has the interpretive mandate.31' Furthermore, the fact
that prior courts reasonably interpreted the statute did not mean
that the inherent ambiguity of § 6501(e)(1)(A) had been wiped
away; therefore, the court found that it must defer to the Treas-
ury's interpretation.'12
The Federal Circuit's analysis of Chevron step two is critical.
The taxpayer in Grapevine had argued that the temporary Treas-
ury regulation should not receive Chevron deference because of
"procedural shortcomings" in the regulation's issuance.' The
court did not discuss the merits of this claim. Rather, the court
declared that because the regulations had been issued in their fi-
nal form prior to judicial review, arguments regarding procedural
violations have become moot.' The court then found that there
was "little doubt" that final Treasury regulations are entitled to
Chevron deference."'
307. Alan Horowitz, Federal Circuit Plunges Deep into the Weeds of Chevron Analysis in
Grapevine Oral Argument, TAx APPELLATE BLOG (Jan. 26, 2011),
http://appellatetax.com/2011/01/26/federal-circuit-plunges-deep-into-the-weeds-of-chevron-
analysis-in-grapevine-oral-argument.
308. See Grapevine, 636 F.3d at 1377.
309. Id. at 1371.
310. Id. at 1376.
311. Id. at 1378.
312. Id. at 1379.
313. Grapevine, 636 F.3d at 1380.
314. Id. at 1380. In other words, because the Treasury did accept public comment before
issuing the final regulations (i.e., engage in classic interim-final rulemaking), the fact that
it chose not to do so prior to issuing the binding, temporary regulations was of no concern to
the court.




The Fifth Circuit took precisely the opposite tack to the regula-
316
tions when it rendered its decision on the overstated basis issue.
In Burks v. United States, the Fifth Circuit found Colony to be
controlling with respect to the phrase "omits from gross income."'17
Because the court decided that the statute was unambiguous, the
deference analysis failed at Chevron step one, and there was no
need to give further consideration to the regulation. 8 Yet, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not stop its opinion at
that point, but issued a provocative statement of dicta regarding
the government's argument for Chevron deference.31 9
The court considered how the recent Mayo decision should im-
pact the judicial deference question relative to regulations like the
one at issue.32° The court explicitly declared that it would not have
deferred to the regulation under Chevron, even if the statute were
ambiguous. 2' On this point, the court emphasized an important
difference between Mayo and the overstated basis cases-namely,
the litigation-aimed nature of the regulations that were promul-
gated absent notice-and-comment. 2  Noting that the Supreme
Court has said that it is inappropriate to defer "'to what appears
to be nothing more than the agency's convenient litigating posi-
tion , the Fifth Circuit stated that the "Commissioner 'may not
take advantage of his power to promulgate regulations during the
course of a litigation for the purpose of providing himself with a
defense based on the presumption of validity accorded to such
regulations.'"324
In addition, the court questioned the propriety of the govern-
ment's request for deference to final regulations that were largely
316. Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2011).
317. Burks, 633 F.3d at 351, 353.
318. Id. at 360.
319. Id. at 360 n.9 (citing Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 711).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 360 & n.9 (citing Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 711). That is, even if the regulation had
passed Chevron step one, the Fifth Circuit would have found the regulation deficient at
Chevron step two.
322. Burks, 633 F.3d at 360 n.9 ("Mayo emphasized that the regulations at issue had
been promulgated following notice and comment procedures, 'a consideration identified ...
as a significant sign that a rule merits Chevron deference.' Legislative regulations are
generally subject to notice and comment procedure pursuant to the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. Here, the government issued the Temporary Regulations without subjecting
them to notice and comment procedures. This is a practice that the Treasury apparently
employs regularly." (citations omitted)).
323. Id. (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988)).
324. Id. (quoting Chock Full 0' Nuts Corp. v. United States, 453 F.2d 300, 303 (2d Cir.
1979)).
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indistinguishable from the temporary regulations, admonishing
that the fact "[t]hat the government allowed for notice and com-
ment after the final Regulations were enacted is not an acceptable
substitute for pre-promulgation notice and comment."325 With this
sentence, the Fifth Circuit became the only circuit amongst the
overstated basis courts to explicitly recognize that regulations
promulgated without notice-and-comment should not automati-
cally be granted Chevron deference. 26
When the issue was presented to the highest Court, the Justices
had the choice of continuing the nearly five-year long journey to-
ward final resolution down one of numerous paths. The Court, in
a plurality decision authored by Justice Breyer, ultimately decided
in favor of the taxpayer on Colony grounds; i.e., that the statute is
unambiguous as stated in Colony, and thus, no room exists for
subsequent agency interpretation and ended its opinion at that
point.327 The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Kennedy and
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan found the
definition of "omits from gross income" to be ambiguous, and none-
theless, swept aside the APA violations.32 s Thus, as a whole, the
Court's opinion completely avoided laying down a broad-based rule
that APA violations will affect the judicial deference equation.
325. Id. (emphasis added) (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 214-15 (5th Cir.
1979)).
326. Two other circuits, the Seventh and the Ninth, also addressed the overstated-basis-
as-omission issue. See Beard v. Comm'r, 633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct.
2099 (2012) (mem.); Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm'r, 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir.
2009). Beard only addressed the application of Colony to the facts of the case and did not
address the viability or applicability of the regulation. Beard, 633 F.3d 616, 619-23. The
case out of the Ninth Circuit, Bakersfield, was decided before Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-i
(2011) was in place. 568 F.3d 767. The Ninth Circuit followed Colony and held in favor of
the taxpayer. Id.
327. In this case, the Court could refuse to defer to the regulation at Chevron step one.
Whether the regulation was issued properly and should be given deference, i.e., the step
two inquiry, would not be reached, unless in dicta.
328. The dissent fails to even mention the Administrative Procedure Act or the argu-
ments raised by the respondents and amici addressing the regulation's APA violations. The
dissenting opinion should be troubling to taxpayers and those in favor of enforcing the
APA. Both the respondents and amici expressly noted the APA violations committed by the
Treasury and argued that these violations should lead to a conclusion that the regulation
fails at Chevron step two. See generally, Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hick-
man in Support of Respondents, supra note 231. However, the dissent would have granted
deference to the agency regulation based purely on the finding that the interpreted statute
was ambiguous. See Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1849-53 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Chevron step two was not even mentioned in passing. The most troubling aspect of the
dissent is the fact that Justice Kennedy was joined by three other justices, including rela-
tively new Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. Id. at 1849. The potential implications of the
dissenting opinion and its wholesale failure to recognize the second step of Chevron may
form the subject of a future article.
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Thus, the Court missed a valuable opportunity to shed clarity
on a hazy area of administrative procedure and judicial doctrine.
Home Concrete provided a fine opportunity for the Court to defini-
tively rule that APA-violative regulations will fail to garner man-
datory judicial deference.329 The Court wholly failed, even in dicta,
to do so. Thus, it is likely that this issue will present itself before
the Court again, and the importance of notice-and-comment rule-
making is anything but a purely academic issue."' In order for the
Supreme Court to rule on the issue it failed to address in Home
Concrete, it must find that Chevron provides the appropriate stan-
dard of review for APA-violative regulations and that these proce-
durally defective regulations fail at Chevron step two.
IV. AGENCY REGULATIONS THAT VIOLATE THE APA FAIL TO
QUALIFY FOR DEFERENCE UNDER STEP TWO OF CHEVRON
In order to find that APA-violative regulations fail at Chevron
step two, the Court must first determine that Chevron in fact pro-
vides the appropriate standard of review.33' Chevron review
should be utilized when reviewing Home Concrete-esque regula-
tions-i.e., those regulations which violate the APA yet carry legal
force-quite simply, because the doctrinal prerequisites of Chev-
ron are present even if Treasury has not abided by the APA when
promulgating its regulation. The use of Chevron deference is re-
quired where: (1) an agency has issued a regulation pursuant to
Congressional authority, and (2) that regulation carries the force
of law.332 Treasury regulations issued pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(a)
329. In this vein, Professor Hickman has submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of
the taxpayer-respondents, calling the Court's attention to the procedural violations com-
mitted by the Treasury and urging the Court to invalidate Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-1 at
Chevron step two. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hickman in Support of
Respondents, supra note 231.
330. See Hickman, supra note 66, at 1758. Professor Hickman's empirical analysis of
the Treasury regulations found that the Treasury often receives "significant input" from
the public when it does submit regulations for comment. Id. Out of the 131 projects which
had reached a stage at which it was disclosed whether or not the Treasury had received
comments, 96 (73.3 percent) generated at least one comment raising concerns or suggesting
changes. Id. This finding suggests that the majority of the time, regulations that are sub-
mitted for notice and comment will actually receive comments. In other words, the notice-
and-comment process works. It is not a mere formality designed to suggest public partici-
pation; it actually fosters public discourse. This realization makes the lack of notice-and-
comment on so many occasions all the more disconcerting.
331. In other words, Chevron must be the starting point for the Court's analysis, rather
than one of the deference alternatives, e.g., National Muffler or Skidmore.
332. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
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invariably meet these requirements.333 Neither jurisprudential
nor normative support any longer exists for an argument that §
7805(a) regulations should be analyzed using any other standard
of review than Chevron.
Mayo all but foreclosed the possibility of approaching Treasury
regulations from a National Muffler standpoint.334  Although a
multi-factor approach to regulations certainly provides greater
flexibility, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that
when Congress places the primary authority for interpreting stat-
utes in the hands of an administrative agency, the judiciary
should defer to that agency so long as it has acted reasonably.
Thus, affording Treasury regulations only Skidmore respect from
the outset would not honor the precedential mandates of the
Court.
35
Even when a Treasury regulation has been issued without no-
tice-and-comment, it still carries the force of law.3 6 Procedural
defects do not give taxpayers an excuse from complying with tax
regulations when they file their returns. If taxpayers fail to com-
ply with a regulation-even a procedurally defective one-they
can be subject to penalties and legal sanctions.337 Moreover, very
few procedurally defective Treasury regulations are challenged
and invalidated under the APA. 338 Thus, the Court is considering
a regulation that carries the force of law and must be analyzed
under Chevron.
On a simplistic level, therefore, the holding of Mayo would seem
to apply to the Court's decision in Home Concrete. Mayo held that
Treasury regulations are entitled to no less deference than any
other administrative regulations, and whether the regulations
were promulgated via I.R.C. § 7805(a) or otherwise, Chevron pro-
333. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714
(2011).
334. See Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714. Moreover, the recent Home Concrete decision rein-
forces the utilization of Chevron as the starting point for Treasury regulations. The Court
proceeded to analyze the Home Concrete interpretive issue under Chevron even through the
case was clearly tax-specific. See Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1843-44.
335. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27. Skidmore respect is only appropriate when review-
ing those agency actions that do not carry the force of law. Id. For example, in the case of
the Treasury/IRS, actions such as issuing Revenue Rulings or Private Letter Rulings would
be subject to a Skidmore review, because such actions may be persuasive but are not bind-
ing.
336. Although APA § 706 mandates that courts invalidate procedurally-defective regula-
tions, if no party has challenged the regulation under § 706, then the regulation stands as
agency law. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
337. See I.R.C. § 6662 (2006).
338. See infra Part V.
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vides the appropriate standard of review.339 Thus, under this
chain of logic and precedent, one could argue that Treasury Regu-
lation § 301.6501(e)-i is entitled to Chevron deference. However,
this surface-level analysis misses the link between Chevron review
and Chevron deference-merely finding that Chevron is the appro-
priate standard only means that a regulation is entitled to manda-
tory deference if it meets the two-part test. This is where the
Home Concrete regulation diverges from the Mayo regulation.
From a stare decisis perspective, the regulations considered and
afforded deference in Mayo Foundation are fundamentally dis-
similar from the regulations at play in Home Concrete; thus,
Mayo's pro-deference holding does not constitute binding prece-
dent for the Home Concrete Court.340 The regulations in Mayo
were promulgated in compliance with the APA and were not in-
terim-final rules aimed at influencing pending litigation. 4' The
regulations in Home Concrete, of course, are precisely the oppo-
site.342 Although Mayo unequivocally held that § 7805(a) Treasury
regulations are afforded Chevron deference pursuant to Mead, the
Mayo Court clearly considered that the regulations were promul-
gated through notice-and-comment procedures-this fact was
mentioned more than once in the opinion. 43
Inherent in the Chevron doctrine, though often overlooked in
practice, is the fact that an agency's fulfillment of Chevron step
one does not automatically lead to a judgment in favor of the
agency on the deference question. The overwhelming number of
courts confronted with a Chevron question, who found that a regu-
339. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714.
340. In other words, the Court need not find that, just because the § 7805(a) regulations
were granted Chevron deference in Mayo, the § 7805(a) regulations must be granted Chev-
ron deference in Home Concrete.
341. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 714.
342. See supra note 265. It is true that the Mead Court did establish that a lack of no-
tice and public comment, by itself, would not destroy a regulation's chance for Chevron
deference. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231-32 (2001). However, this
statement should not be read to excuse an agency's willful non-compliance with the APA.
The reason is that the APA itself exempts certain regulations from notice-and-comment
requirements. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006); see also supra
note 73. Thus, a better reading of the foregoing statement from Mead is that, when a regu-
lation is exempt from the APA's notice-and-comment requirements and that regulation is
issued without notice-and-comment, the lack of public notice and opportunity for comment
will not prevent that regulation from receiving Chevron deference. However, where a regu-
lation is subject to the APA § 553 mandates and the agency chooses to forego such require-
ments, it has acted unreasonably and in violation of Chevron step two.
343. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 710, 714.
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lation passed step one, have validated the regulation.344 These
results could be interpreted to mean that challengers must win
the Chevron step one battle or concede defeat, and some commen-
tators have reasoned as such.45  However, where an agency has
clearly acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in promulgating a regu-
lation, courts have the discretion to refuse to defer to that regula-
tion.346 This leads to the second critical aspect of the Court's sug-
gested decision in Home Concrete-that APA-violative Treasury
regulations fail Chevron step two.
Because of the discretion it affords to reviewing courts, step two
of Chevron is where the judiciary can strike an appropriate bal-
ance between proper agency deference and blind agency faithful-
ness. As much as the issue may have been debated in the early to
mid-twentieth century, it is now axiomatic that administrative
344. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 31 (1998). Mr. Kerr conducted
an empirical study of all cases in the United States Courts of Appeals between 1995 and
1996 that utilized the Chevron test. Id. at 4. Mr. Kerr found that, in the span of two
years, courts applied the Chevron doctrine 253 times. Id. at 30. Of those 253 times (223
published cases), the courts accepted the agency's interpretation 73% of the time. Id. Of
those courts which applied Chevron, the analysis was resolved at step one 38% of the time
and at step two 62% of the time. Id. at 31. At step one, the agency views were upheld
twenty-nine times and rejected forty times. Id. However, where the statute was declared
ambiguous and the court moved on to step two, the agency constructions were accepted in
100 cases and rejected in only 12 cases. Id. In sum, if a challenger did not prevail at step
one, he had only an 11% chance of winning the ultimate Chevron battle. See id. at 30-31.
345. Juan F. Vasquez & Peter A. Lowy, Challenging Temporary Treasury Regulations:
An Analysis of the Administrative Procedure Act, Legislative Reenactment Doctrine, Defer-
ence, and Invalidity, 3 Hous. BUS. & TAX L.J. 248, 273 (2003) ("Due to the difficulty of prov-
ing 'legislative regulations' are 'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute,'
it becomes clear a taxpayer stands a much better chance of winning under Chevron if the
statute is deemed unambiguous, thereby enabling a court to decide the case at step one.").
346. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,844 (1984).
But cf. Motor Vehicles Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). Al-
though outside the context of Chevron per se, the Supreme Court has articulated the mean-
ing of "arbitrary and capricious" for purposes of the APA. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48. In
State Farm, the Supreme Court held that the arbitrary and capricious standard of APA §
706(2)(A) requires agencies to articulate their reasons for choosing the particular interpre-
tation adopted. Id. at 48. In a recent case before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge
Ambro argued that a Treasury regulation (Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1)) should be consid-
ered substantively insufficient to pass Chevron step two, where the Treasury did not articu-
late its reasoning for promulgating such regulation. Mannella v. Comm'r, 631 F.3d 115,
127-28 (3d Cir. 2011) (Ambro, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe IRS has not advanced any reasoning
for its decision to impose a two-year limitations period on taxpayers ... leaving us no basis
to conduct the analysis mandated by Chevron step two... Because the IRS has not articu-
lated its reasoning, we cannot discern whether the two-year limit falls into the permissible,
or the arbitrary and capricious category."). And, critically, a United States Supreme Court
decision issued in December of 2011 affirms that the review process of State Farm and the
Chevron step two analysis are "the same," because both analyze the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard of APA § 706(2)(A). See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011).
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agencies are the proper and foremost interpreters of the statutes
they are called to administer.347 However, never has Congress de-
manded that the judiciary follow every whim of the administrative
state. When an administrative agency has abused its discretion-
as broad as that discretion may be-it is proper for the courts to
abate the agency's power.3 4 8
The consistent lack of fidelity to the APA's procedural mandates
demonstrates that the Treasury has abused its discretion in inter-
preting and administering the I.R.C. This is certainly not to say
that the Treasury is some sort of evil empire, disregarding the
rules out of spite. In fact, there are many sound policy reasons
why the Treasury promulgates regulations outside of notice-and-
comment.349  Substantial time and effort are required for an
agency to comply with notice-and-comment procedural mandates,
and taxpayers may request guidance on a more immediate basis.""
Interim-final rulemaking can be viewed as a laudable compro-
347. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983
(2005).
348. Professor Hickman concisely explains the rationale behind notice-and-comment
rulemaking and the balance that this manner of rulemaking attempts to strike, in her 2007
empirical study of the Treasury rulemaking practices, stating that:
APA rulemaking requirements, combined with judicial review, are part of an effort to
gain the benefits of agency manpower and expertise yet guard against the worst ele-
ments of agency behavior. Procedural requirements are perhaps most important
when agencies act to dictate or restrict the actions of regulated parties with the force
and effect of law, as through binding regulations. Legislative regulations are practi-
cally indistinguishable from the statutes under which they are promulgated, yet they
are not derived from the same legislative process as statutes. Instead, the notice-
and-comment procedures imposed by the APA on such regulations, with their empha-
sis on public participation, are an important if imperfect proxy for a more democratic
legislative process.
Hickman, supra note 66, at 1805-06. Allowing the administrative state to function in a
manner similar to other legislative bodies-and thereby function in a constitutionally-
permissible manner-is the purpose behind notice-and-comment rulemaking. Because this
policy rationale is so fundamental to the viability and constitutionality of the administra-
tive state, an agency's failure to abide by notice-and-comment procedures is unreasonable
and must be tempered by the courts.
349. The Treasury often cites the fact that taxpayers both need and desire immediate
guidance as to how to follow the complex statutory schemes of the I.R.C. See, e.g., Guid-
ance Under Section 1502, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,175, 51,176 (Aug. 18, 2004); Return of Partner-
ship Income, 69 Fed. Reg. 12,068, 12,068 (Mar. 15, 2004); Effect of Elections in Certain
Multi-Step Transactions, 68 Fed. Reg. 40,766, 40,767 (July 9, 2003); see also Internal Reve-
nue Manual, supra note 14 ("'These regulations are necessary to provide taxpayers with
immediate guidance.'"). This justification fails, however, due to the availability of other
persuasive, yet non-binding, forms of guidance, such as Private Letter Rulings. See supra
note 84.
350. See RICHARD J. PIERCEET, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.4.6b, at 336 (4th ed. 2004) ("Promulgation of a sin-
gle major rule often requires five to ten years and tens of thousands of agency staff hours.").
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mise-the Treasury, while technically violating the notice-and-
comment requirements, still can consider commentary by the pub-
lic before issuing final regulations.
The problem with the foregoing policy justifications is that the
end (more efficient agency administration and quicker guidance to
taxpayers) does not justify the means (willful violation of a fun-
damental statute). Agencies are bound to follow the mandates set
forth by Congress, and may not eschew statues merely because it
is more efficient or even, at times, beneficial to the public. The
APA provides only a few well-defined exceptions to notice-and-
comment rulemaking.35' When a regulation does not come within
one of these exceptions, and an agency willingly foregoes notice-
and-comment rulemaking anyway, it has abused its discretion and
acted unreasonably. It has, from a plain textual reading, violated
Chevron step two.
Finally, from a simple standpoint of fundamental fairness, it is
viscerally disconcerting to allow an agency to influence the result
of pending litigation to which that agency is also a party-
especially when that agency violates administrative law through
its actions. This is precisely what happened in Home Concrete.
The Treasury did not issue an APA-violative rule in this case to
administer quick and efficient guidance to taxpayers. It issued
the regulation to overturn the unfavorable decisions it received at
the trial level and guarantee a victory at the appellate level. Be-
cause the government is applying Treasury Regulation §
301.6501(e)-i to all cases currently pending, 5 2 it is axiomatic that
the regulation applies to litigation in which the government is a
party. This equates to the scenario described at the outset of this
Article: a litigant issuing a rule that will affect the outcome of
litigation, then demanding that the Court-that supposed final
arbiter of the law 113-grant deference to the litigant's rule.
As troubling as this scenario may seem, it would be legally ac-
ceptable if the rule was issued in compliance with the APA. A
compliant rule would have at least given notice to the public and
taken into account the public's comments before becoming effec-
tive.354 However, without even this most basic assurance of fair-
351. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006).
352. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-l(e) (2010).
353. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
354. As a practical matter, a rule issued with notice-and-comment would be less likely to
affect ongoing litigation, as the events relevant to the litigation would have already been
completed before the rule's effective date. Moreover, unlike interim-final rulemaking, un-
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ness, the policy behind tripartite government is all but eviscer-
ated.35 Thus, in the case of APA-noncompliant regulations, the
judiciary must be allowed to rein in the power of the administra-
tive state and be permitted to use its own discretion when inter-
preting administrative regulations.356
V. TAXPAYERS SHOULD NOT BE FORCED TO CHALLENGE
PROCEDURALLY DEFICIENT REGULATIONS THROUGH AN APA
CHALLENGE
A final argument remains in favor of upholding APA-violative
regulations under Chevron, and this argument addresses the pro-
posed remedy rather than the regulation itself. That is, one could
assert that the judicial deference doctrine is not the appropriate
framework in which to analyze non-compliant regulations, be-
cause the APA itself provides a procedure for challenging violative
regulations.57 Thus, taxpayers or other interested parties could
conceivably challenge non-compliant regulations before they are
ever enforced.358 Obviously, this would make the Chevron question
moot, because non-compliant regulations would be challenged at
the outset of their promulgation, and the IRS would never have
the opportunity to utilize them in a case before the court. How-
ever, along with the practical and psychological reasons why tax-
payers may forgo many APA challenges, two important statutory
dertaking notice-and-comment before a rule is made effective allows the public to actively
participate in the rulemaking, rather than fight against an already-binding rule that the
agency seems unlikely to change. See supra text accompanying note 69.
355. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64 (explaining that the strictures of the APA
were put in place to ensure that administrative rulemaking stayed faithful to the ideals
underlying the balance and separation of powers).
356. The idea that a court would have discretion to not defer to an administrative regu-
lation does not mean that the court would necessarily choose this course. Discretion not to
defer also means that the court would have discretion to defer. Luckily, existing jurispru-
dence provides a bounty of factors that courts could examine when deciding whether or not
to defer to a regulation. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). The
Court stated in Mead that, when confronted with an administrative regulation, the choice
is not between mandatory Chevron deference and no deference at all. United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2001) (deciding that the regulation at issue was not entitled
to mandatory Chevron deference, but that it may be entitled to some (persuasive-if-not-
binding) level of deference). Holding that APA-violative regulations are not entitled to
Chevron deference only means that courts could follow the regulation's guidance, if pru-
dent, or issue their own interpretations.
357. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
358. Some may argue that this is the only viable means to challenge a non-compliant
regulation. In other words, if a taxpayer foregoes challenging a regulation for procedural
reasons when it is promulgated, she should not later be allowed to argue against that regu-
lation on procedural grounds--she has missed the window of opportunity.
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obstacles also lie in the way of a taxpayer's pre-enforcement chal-
lenge to procedurally defective Treasury regulations: I.R.C. §
7421 and the Declaratory Judgment Act.
I.R.C. § 7421(a) ("AIA") provides that "no suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be main-
tained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is
the person against whom such tax was assessed."359 Several nar-
row exceptions to this general rule do exist, most procedural in
nature.36 ° Similarly, the Declaratory Judgment Act ("DJA") con-
tains a tax exception, which prevents courts from providing de-
claratory relief for controversies "with respect to Federal taxes." '
Federal courts have often agreed that the two statutes work con-
terminously.362
The Supreme Court has interpreted the policy of both the AIA
and the DJA as one of administrative efficiency, stating that the
purpose of both statutes is "to permit the United States to assess
and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial intervention,
and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be deter-
mined in a suit for refund ....",363 Thus, the AIA and the DJA
work to facilitate the "prompt collection of [the government's] law-
ful revenue."364 These statutory provisions reinforce the general
revenue collection rule of "pay first, litigate later."65
Although the AIA and the DJA are facially directed at contro-
versies involving individual tax collection, the Court interprets
these provisions broadly to preclude pre-enforcement review of tax
cases raising questions beyond the liabilities of individual taxpay-
359. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (West 2012). This code provision is often referred to as the Anti-
Injunction Act ("AIA") and bars many pre-enforcement challenges based on the I.R.C. See
United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2008).
360. See, for example, I.R.C. § 7421(a), which permits judicial review when the IRS
attempts to collect taxes without mailing the taxpayer a notice of deficiency. See also id. §
6213(a) (precluding assessment without notice of deficiency); id. § 6212(a) (authorizing
notices of deficiency by certified or registered mail); id. § 7421(a) (establishing violations of
I.R.C. § 6212(a) as an exception to the general rule).
361. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (West 2012)). Like I.R.C. § 7421(a),
this statute provides certain narrow exceptions, which are not applicable in the run of the
mill case wherein a taxpayer wishes to challenge the Treasury's violation of the APA. Id.
362. See, e.g., Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011); Bob Jones
Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 732 n.7 (1974).
363. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
364. Williams Packaging, 370 U.S. at 7.
365. Bryan T. Camp, The Equal Protection Problem in Innocent Spouse Protection, 112
TAX NOTES 281, n.7 (2006).
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ers.365 The United States Supreme Court has extended the appli-
cation of these statutes to claims that have only indirect bearing
on Federal revenue collection. For example, the AIA barred a tax-
payer's petition for injunctive and declaratory relief where the pe-
tition, if granted, would have had the effect of reducing other indi-
viduals' tax liabilities 7.3 " Lower courts have followed suit, denying
judicial review of Treasury regulations that merely "concern" the
collection of federal taxes, whether or not they directly impact the
individual liability of the taxpayer bringing the claim.368
Moreover, very few common law exceptions to the AIA and the
DJA exist, and these exceptions have been applied narrowly. In
Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., the Supreme Court
held that a taxpayer's claim is not subject to I.R.C. § 7421 if: (1)
"under no circumstances could the Government ultimately pre-
vail," and (2) "the taxpayer would suffer irreparable injury if col-
lection were effected."369 Because it would be the very rare case in
which the government could not even assert a colorable position
for its attempted collection, the Williams Packaging exception to
the general bar against pre-enforcement review in tax cases is not
much of a weapon for taxpayers.37 °
The other judicially recognized exception to I.R.C. § 7421 is
enunciated in South Carolina v. Regan. 371 Therein, the Court held
366. See LAURENCE F. CASEY, 1 FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE § 2:36 (2d ed. 1997 & 2011 up-
date).
367. In Bob Jones Univ., a private university sought relief from an IRS threat to with-
draw the university's tax-exempt status due to race-based admissions policies. 416 U.S. at
725. The Supreme Court found that the university's petition would have the effect of "re-
strain[ing] the .. .collection of taxes" from the university's donors, if not the university
itself, because the IRS would be forced to "continue to provide assurance to those donors
that contributions to [the university] will be recognized as tax deductible, thereby reducing
their tax liability." Id. at 738-39.
368. See, e.g., Debt Buyers' Ass'n v. Snow, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1,15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (hold-
ing that consumer information reporting regulations could not be reviewed, because the
reported information would assist the IRS in determining the tax liability of other taxpay-
ers relative to income from discharged debt); Foodservice & Lodging Inst. v. Regan, 809
F.2d 842, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that pre-enforcement judicial review of regulations
governing how restaurant employers allocate and report tip income among employees was
barred by I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1982) and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201
(Supp. III 1985)).
369. Williams Packaging, 370 U.S. at 6-7.
370. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has never actually applied Williams
Packaging to find jurisdiction over a case. See Hickman, supra note 110, at 1171 (discuss-
ing cases in which the Williams Packaging exception was discussed but ultimately re-
jected). Lower courts have only utilized this exception in cases of "obvious and egregious
IRS error or flagrant IRS disregard of established law combined with significant financial
imposition upon the taxpayer." Id.
371. South Carolina v. Regan, 65 U.S. 367 (1984).
Duquesne Law Review
that the AIA will not apply to preclude pre-enforcement challenges
only where the taxpayer has no other legal remedy available."2
Unfortunately for the would-be challenger, federal courts have
repeatedly stated that the taxpayer always has the available legal
remedy of paying the tax and challenging it via a refund action.373
Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that South Carolina v.
Regan-with its mandate that a taxpayer have no other legal
remedy available-could be used to initiate a pre-enforcement
challenge of procedurally defective Treasury regulations.
Likewise, there are many practical reasons why a taxpayer may
not bring an APA challenge to procedurally infirm regulations,
even post-enforcement. Because the courts so often remind us
that taxpayers have the option of paying a tax then suing for a
refund,374 one may assume that taxpayers could easily raise APA
challenges during their refund actions. However, as with pre-
enforcement review, there are serious limitations on a taxpayer's
ability to bring an enforcement-based APA challenge.
First, in order to obtain judicial review via a refund claim, a
taxpayer must first pursue an administrative review process out-
lined in the I.R.C.37 Refund claims arise when a taxpayer re-
quests a refund of taxes already paid, and the IRS either rejects
the claim or fails to act within six months.7 Deficiency litigation
arises in a similar fashion: the IRS concludes that a taxpayer
owes additional taxes or penalties and issues a notice of defi-
ciency, which the taxpayer contests in Tax Court.
3 7
Though the refund process sounds simplistic and is often cited
by courts as an adequate remedy, refund claims are subject to
thorough administrative review by the IRS.37 In other words, by
submitting a refund claim, a taxpayer subjects herself to the
equivalent of a second audit. This raises the risk that the IRS will
find additional issues and claim underpayment.3 79 For many tax-
372. Regan, 465 U.S. at 378, 380-81.
373. See, e.g., United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2008);
Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 401 (4th Cir. 2011).
374. See supra note 365.
375. See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (2000) (stating that a taxpayer must exhaust administrative
remedies with the IRS before pursuing a refund claim in court).
376. Id.; id. § 6532(a)(1).
377. See id. § 6211(a); id. § 6212(a); id. § 6213(a) (defining and authorizing deficiencies
and petitions).
378. See Treas. Reg. § 601.105(e)(2) (1987) (stating that the examination of refund
claims is subject to the same procedure and level of scrutiny as general audits).
379. See GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL TAX
CONTROVERSIES § 14.01 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that on administrative refund claims, the IRS
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payers, this risk outweighs the potential benefit of raising an APA
challenge.
In addition, taxpayers may be offered a settlement during the
IRS appeals process."' The ability of an individual to escape the
appeals process by paying only a fraction of his total liability expo-
sure may make settlement an attractive option in many cases. Of
course, when the settlement occurs entirely within the IRS admin-
istrative review process, there is no opportunity for judicial review
of the pertinent Treasury regulations."' Not only is this method of
settling claims beneficial for the taxpayer, but the IRS also bene-
fits. Settlement agreements are confidential.382 Thus, if the IRS
Appeals Officer knows that the taxpayer has a potential APA chal-
lenge, the practical likelihood that the IRS and the taxpayer will
often looks beyond the issues raised by the taxpayer in hopes of finding offsetting liabili-
ties).
380. See Internal Revenue Manual, Part 8. Appeals, Chapter 6. Conference and Settle-
ment Practices, Section 4. Reaching Settlement and Securing an Appeals Agreement Form,
Fair and Impartial Settlements per Appeals Mission, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 8.6.4.1
(Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part8/irm_08-006-004.html#d0e37. IRS appeals
officers have the authority to settle a taxpayer's refund claim, after considering the
strengths and weaknesses of the case and the likely outcome of litigation, for a percentage
of the taxpayer's potential liability.
381. In this way, taxpayers are unique from other administratively regulated persons
and entities. Would-be challengers of Treasury regulations are often individuals or busi-
nesses with nonrecurring interpretive issues. For example, an individual taxpayer may
find himself faced with a procedurally-defective Treasury regulation that impacts his re-
fund claim. This taxpayer may have engaged in a transaction that is unlikely to recur,
such as the sale of a business, the disposition of a capital asset, or the administration of an
estate. For this taxpayer, the benefit of challenging the regulation on procedural grounds
in court would not be substantial, as, even if he were successful, he would not ever have to
deal with the regulation again. Furthermore, the procedurally-defective regulation may
not even be dispositive of his claim; thus, a taxpayer could win his APA claim and still lose
his refund claim. The risks he would incur, however, should he forgo the appeals process
and bring his refund claim to court would likely be great. He would risk the court uphold-
ing the regulation and would lose the chance to settle his refund claim. Quite simply, many
taxpayers do not have the necessary incentive to bring their refund or deficiency claims to
court and thereby request judicial review of procedurally-infirm Treasury regulations.
This scenario stands in sharp contrast to the situations of other regulated entities
who commonly do bring APA challenges. For example, a steelmaker who is affected by a
procedurally-defective EPA regulation has incentive to obtain judicial review of this regula-
tion. The EPA regulation does not affect the steel industry on a one-time basis, but rather
will affect industry-wide operations for as long as the regulation is in existence. Further-
more, the steelmaker does not expose itself to additional penalties (like the taxpayer does
by exposing himself to the risk of a second audit) should he challenge the administrative
regulation in court. The benefit of invalidating a defective EPA regulation will therefore be
worth the costs of bringing an APA claim before the court.
382. I.R.C. § 6103(a).
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end up settling without judicial intervention increases.383 Again,
though mutually beneficial, this outcome absolutely prevents judi-
cial review of APA-violative Treasury regulations.384
Finally, from a psychological standpoint, taxpayers may per-
ceive futility in challenging Treasury regulations that fail to com-
ply with the APA, especially, as in Home Concrete, when the in-
firmities have been "cured" by the issuance of final regulations.
As noted supra, the Treasury most often violates the APA, and did
so in Home Concrete, by issuing legally-binding temporary regula-
tions without notice-and-comment and following up with often-
indistinguishable final regulations."5 As explained supra, the very
nature of the Treasury's violation gives taxpayers the idea that a
procedural challenge will be fruitless-the Treasury has already
made up its mind, and a procedural challenge would only delay
the inevitable.386
In sum, many legal and practical impediments stand in the way
of both pre- and post-enforcement challenges to procedurally-
infirm regulations under the APA itself. In many cases, the only
chance a taxpayer will have to challenge the effect of the regula-
tion is before a court faced with the Chevron question. The court
will then decide whether it must defer to the agency's interpreta-
tion, even when that agency did not follow the APA in promulgat-
ing its interpretation, or utilize its own discretion to interpret the
383. See id. Because the settlement agreement would be confidential, the IRS would not
be exposed to the risk that other taxpayers would file "copycat" claims based on the same
APA violation. Id.
384. On an even more basic level, there is a very good chance that taxpayer returns that
are impacted by an APA-violative regulation will never even reach the refund/deficiency
stage. The IRS only accepts roughly one to two percent of tax returns for audit. See
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAx ADMIN., TRENDS IN COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES
THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2010, REFERENCE No. 2011-30-071, 38 app. IV, fig.33 (2011), avail-
able at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2Ollreports/201130071fr.pdf (showing
that of the 142,823,000 returns filed, 1,581,000 were examined). Therefore, if a taxpayer
chooses not to comply with a procedurally defective regulation, there is certainly no guar-
antee that his particular return will be selected for audit. Even if he withholds the tax that
the regulation would otherwise demand and alerts the IRS to this discrepancy, there is no
guarantee that the IRS will notice or pursue collection. In this way, even taxpayers who
adamantly wish to bring an enforcement-based APA challenge have no certitude that their
claim will ever find its way before the judiciary.
385. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
386. In the case of the Home Concrete regulations, Treasury agents explicitly made clear
that this was the case. After the Treasury promulgated Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-i
(2010), but before issuing the final version of the regulation, IRS Associate Chief Counsel
Deborah Butler was quoted as stating that the agency was committed to, and would con-
tinue to litigate until it obtained, "the right answer-i.e., the interpretation advanced in
the temporary regulation. Jeremiah Coder, IRS Undeterred After Tax Court's Intermoun-
tain Decision, 127 TAX NOTES 729, 729 (2010).
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applicable statute. And armed with Chevron's demand of reason-
ableness, that taxpayer can ask the court to take a stand and hold
the agency accountable for violating statutory mandates.
VI. CONCLUSION
In twenty-first century American government, separation of
powers is undeniably fundamental, while the administrative state
is absolutely necessary. Because the ideal of checks and balances
must co-exist with the reality of rule by administrative law, Con-
gress has struck a balance via the APA. This act provides admin-
istrative agencies with a blueprint for promulgating binding regu-
lations and strives to ensure that public notice and participation
will be as much a part of administrative rulemaking as it is in leg-
islative lawmaking.
Home Concrete presented the Supreme Court with the perfect
opportunity to hear a case in which an administrative agency has
violated its APA rulemaking requirements, and an affected party
is challenging that violation under Chevron. Surprisingly, the
Court completely eschewed the issue, failing to provide any guid-
ance on whether APA-violative regulations will be afforded defer-
ence. Because the Court's decision in Home Concrete provided no
elucidation on whether procedurally defective administrative
regulations will be upheld or invalidated under Chevron, it is
highly unlikely that the Treasury's rulemaking practices will
drastically change, and it is almost inevitable that another APA-
based challenge will appear before the Court in the (hopefully
near) future. Taxpayers can only hope that the next time the
Court has the opportunity to face a challenge to an APA-violative
regulation it will do so head on, invalidate the regulation, and
thereby inform the country's most powerful administrative agency
that the rules really do apply to all of us.
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